The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, the Homeland Security Act of 2002,
and the False Dichotomy between Protecting National Security
and Preserving Grand Jury Secrecy
September 11, 2001—in the blink of an eye, buildings demolished, lives shattered,and
the very institutions on which our nation was built shaken to their core. One such institution, the
federal grand jury, continues to reverberate from that day. Long enshrined under the common
law and more recently codified in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e), the doctrine of grand
jury secrecy faces perhaps the most serious threat in its centuries-long history—a threat which
need never have existed.
In response to the continuing danger posed by terrorism, Congress has amended Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) to create unprecedented exceptions to the rule that matters
occurring before a federal grand jury must not be disclosed.1 As part of a much larger plan to
encourage the sharing of information by law enforcement and intelligence officials,2 a new
exception to Rule 6(e) created by the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 facilitates the sharing of grand
jury materials relating to intelligence matters with federal intelligence, immigration, defense,
protective, and security officials.3 A second exception added bythe Homeland Security Act of
2002 authorizes the disclosure of grand jury materials relating to threats to national security,
such as terrorism and sabotage, to a wide array of officials, including foreign officials, for the
purpose of addressing the threat.4 Neither of the new exceptions requires judicial approval of
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disclosures and neither requires a showing that a particularized need exists for the disclosure.
Challenges to the constitutionality of these exceptions are almost certain.5
Unlike many provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 and the Homeland Security
Act of 2002, the provisions creating new exceptions to Rule 6(e) contain no sunset rule.6 The
changes are permanent—they are not wartime security measures. Nonetheless, Congress has an
obligation to revisit these crucial policy decisions made with haste in a time of national crisis.
Part I of this article describes the history of grand jury secrecy within the United States
from its common-law beginnings to the most recent amendments to Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 6(e).7 Part II examines the relationship between the right of grand jury secrecy and
the Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment, concluding that the right of grand jury secrecy
enjoys constitutional protection.8 Part III concludes that the newly created exceptions to Rule
6(e) are at best bad public policy and at worst violations of the Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.9 Finally, Part IV proposes an amendment to Rule 6(e) that would preserve a right
valued for nearly a millennium and bring the new exceptions within constitutional limits without
sacrificing national security interests.10
I. A Brief History of Grand Jury Secrecy within the United States
The history of grand jury secrecy within the United States can be broken down into three
distinct eras: the common law era, the pre-9/11 rules era, and the post-9/11 rules era.
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A. The Common Law Era
The “long-established policy” of protecting grand jury secrecy is “older than our nation
itself.”11 A right to indictment by a grand jury journeyed to the New World with the English
colonists,12 and “in this country as in England of old the grand jury has convened as a body of
laymen, free from technical rules, acting in secret . . . .”13 For centuries, grand jury secrecy
enjoyed the protection of the common law.14
To understand the reasons for grand jury secrecy, one must understand the role of the grand
jury proceeding. Grand jury proceedings have traditionally served two functions: investigating
whether probable cause exists to believe a crime has occurred (i.e., the “sword” or
“investigatory” function)15 and screening cases to shield innocent persons from unwarranted
prosecution (i.e., the “shield” or “screening” function).16 Thus, grand juries serve both the
governmental interest in finding and punishing wrongdoers and the individual interest in
avoiding the indiscriminate exercise of governmental authority. Although the grand jury was
brought into being to serve the investigatory function,17 by the seventeenth century, the
screening function had risen to prominence.18 Indeed, the screening function was viewed by the
11
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15
Susan W. Brenner and Gregory G. Lockhart, Federal Grand Jury Practice § 3.1 (West Group 1996).
16
Id. § 2.2.
17
E.g., Younger, supra note 12, at 1.
18
“[U]nlike its English progenitor, the American grand jury originally began, not as an arm of the executive, but as a
defense against monarchy. It established a screen between accusations and convictions and initiated prosecutions of
corrupt agents of the government.” Kadish, supra note 12, at 10.
12

3

nation’s founders as being of such consequence19 that it was incorporated into the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.20
Given the functions served by the grand jury, it is easy to see why its proceedings must be
conducted in private.21 Long before the discovery of the New World, grand jurors were required
to take an oath of secrecy,22 and long before the War of Independence, governmental
representatives were barred from jury deliberations.23 In 1681, John Somers, a noted scholar
read on both sides of the Atlantic, outlined three reasons why secret proceedings serve the public
good.24 One, if targets were aware of the grand jury proceedings, they might conspire to “hide
their crimes.”25 Two, were targets to be made aware of the proceedings against them, they might
flee.26 Either of these events would impede the investigatory function. Three, questioning
witnesses privately and separately aids in discovering the truth,27 a goal vital to both the
innocent target28 (i.e., the screening function) and the King29 (i.e., the investigatory function).
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Under the common law, the right of grand jury secrecy was qualified in the sense that it
could be overcome upon a showing that disclosure was “essential to the enforcement of the
constitutional guaranties or to the protection, preservation, or enforcement of public or private
rights.”30 The standard applied was stringent. Matters occurring before a grand jury were almost
never subject to disclosure absent a showing of substantial need of some kind.31 A majority of
the reported cases involved requests for disclosure by defendants seeking to contest an
indictment,32 but disclosure was also sought by government attorneys desiring to use grand jury
materials at trial33 and in other proceedings.34 Disclosure was permitted in only a handful of
reported decisions.35
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McKinney v. U.S., 199 F. 25, 38 (8th Cir. 1912) (Sanborn, J., dissenting).
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Persons seeking disclosure bore the burden of showing a particularized need for
disclosure—vague generalities did not suffice.36 For example, grand jury secrecy was “not to be
set aside on every request or suggestion of the person indicted, but only when there [was] a
probability of serious illegality.”37 Further, it was the duty of the court to determine if and when
some other need outweighed the need for secrecy.38 Breach of the rule of secrecy was not taken
lightly and could result in prosecution for criminal contempt.39
These basic policies continued with the adoption of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
6(e), which is discussed in the sections that follow.40
B. Rule 6(e) Before 9/11
Prior to the events of September 11, 2001, both the text of Rule 6(e) and its interpretation by
the United States Supreme Court reflected “the orthodox view that all proceedings before the
Grand Jury should remain secret unless extraordinary circumstances are present.”41

Farrington, 5 F. at 343-48 (recognizing the right of the court to remove the veil of secrecy to investigate
prosecutorial misconduct before the grand jury).
36
E.g., Shushan, 117 F.2d at 113 (finding evidence that the grand jury was not presented direct testimony on a
particular element was insufficient to justify reviewing the record of the proceedings because the element may have
been established using circumstantial evidence); United States Med. Assn., 26 F. Supp. at 429-31 (refusing to review
grand jury record based on the affidavit of a defense counsel that “he has been ‘informed’ by various defendants and
‘believes’ that attorneys for the government presented irrelevant testimony to the grand jury, advised it as to the law,
and requested and persuaded it to return the indictment”).
37
Shushan, 117 F.2d at 113. Accord Perlman, 247 F. at 161 (noting the right of the judge to inspect grand jury
minutes “should be sparingly exercised, unless a strong case is made out requiring examination of the minutes in the
furtherance of justice, or for the protection of individual rights”).
38
E.g., Schmidt v. U.S., 115 F.2d 394, 397 (6th Cir. 1940) (“Logically, the responsibility for relaxing the rule of
secrecy and of supervising any subsequent inquiry should reside in the court, of which the grand jury is a part and
under the general instructions of which it conducted its 'judicial inquiry.'”); Goodman, 108 F.2d at 521 (holding “the
court may at any time in the furtherance of justice remove the seal of privacy from grand jury proceedings”);
Central Supply Assn., 34 F. Supp. at 243 (“We all know that from earliest times the veil of secrecy was cast over the
deliberations of the grand jury and they were not called upon to disclose what occurred during their deliberations
except in a judicial inquiry directed by a court.”); United States Medical Association, 26 F. Supp. at 430 (finding
only a court could release grand jurors from their oath of secrecy). But see Atwell , 162 F. at 101 (finding grand
jurors were not bound to oath of secrecy “after presentment and indictment found, made public, and custody of the
accused had, and the grand jury finally discharged”).
39
Blalock v. U.S., 844 F.2d 1546, 1556-57 (11th Cir. 1988) (citing in re Summerhayes, 70 F. 769, 773-74 (N.D. Cal.
1895)).
40
See infra notes 41 to 188 and accompanying text.
41
U.S. v. Papaioanu, 10 F.R.D. 517, 518 (D. Del. 1950).

6

1. The Text of Rule 6(e)
In 1944, the common-law doctrine of grand jury secrecy was codified bythe adoption of
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e). As adopted, Rule 6(e) stated:
Disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury other than its
deliberations and the vote of any juror may be made to the attorneys for the
government for use in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, a juror,
attorney, interpreter or stenographer may disclose matters occurring before
the grand jury only when so directed by the court preliminary to or in
conjunction with a judicial proceeding or when permitted by the court at the
request of the defendant upon a showing that grounds may exist for a motion
to dismiss because of matters occurring before the grand jury.42
Despite the absence of an express provision permitting contempt as a remedy for unauthorized
disclosure, the courts continued to view contempt as the proper sanction for persons removing
the veil of secrecy.43
According to the Advisory Committee, the new rule “continue[d] the traditional practice
of secrecy on the part of members of the grand jury, except when the court permits a
disclosure.”44 Rulemakers seemingly never questioned the idea that this practice must continue;
grand secrecy was part and parcel of the Criminal Rules from the preliminary draft.45 In the notes

42

Fed. R. Crim P. 6(e) (1976) (amended 1977).
E.g., U.S. v. Hoffa, 349 F.2d 20, 43 (6th Cir. 1965) (finding the proper sanction for unauthorized disclosure would
be contempt); U.S. v. Schiavo 375 F.Supp. 475, 478 (D.C.Pa. 1974) (noting the proper sanction for unauthorized
disclosure would be “to punish the offending party in a contempt proceeding); U.S. v. Smyth 104 F.Supp. 283,
293 (D.C.Cal. 1952) (concluding a court has the inherent power to “discipline the attorneys, the attendants or the
grand jurors themselves for breach of the secrecy surrounding the body.” This practice was consistent with the
intent of the rulemakers as expressed in the notes accompanying the early drafts of the Rule. E.g., Fed. R. Crim. P.
6 advisory committee’s note (Second Prelim. Draft 1944) (reprinted in Drafting History of the Felderal Rules of
Criminal Procedure vol. IV, 20 (Madeleine J. Wilken & Nicholas Triffin eds. 1991)) (“Violation of this rule renders
such person liable to contempt proceedings.”).
44
Fed. R. Crim. P. 6 advisory committee’s note. Accord U.S. v. Sells Eng’g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 425 (1983).
45
Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c) (Prelim. Draft of Adv. Comm. 1942) (reprinted in Drafting History of the Felderal Rules of
Criminal Procedure vol. I, 50 (Madeleine J. Wilken & Nicholas Triffin eds. 1991)).
43
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accompanying the early drafts of the Rule,46 the Committee specifically pointed to the
justifications for secrecy set forth in United States v. Providence Tribune Co.,47 which warned:
Secrecy is essential to the proceedings of a grand jury for many reasons. Publicity
may defeat justice by warning offenders to escape, to destroy evidence, or to
tamper with witnesses. . . .Secrecy is also required in order that the reputations of
innocent persons may not suffer from the fact that their conduct is under
investigation, or has been investigated, by a grand jury. . . . Secrecy is further
required for the protection of witnesses who may go before the grand jury, and to
encourage them to make full disclosure of their knowledge of subjects and
persons under investigation, without fear of evil consequences to themselves.48
The term “matters occurring before the grand jury” has been interpreted to
encompass and protect a wide variety of materials.49
[It] includes not only what has occurred and what is occurring, but also what is
likely to occur. Encompassed within the rule of secrecy are “the identities of
witnesses or jurors, the substance of testimony” as well as actual transcripts, “the
strategy or direction of the investigation, the deliberations or questions of jurors,
and the like.”50
The basic idea is to prevent the disclosure of “anything which may reveal what occurred before
the grand jury.”51 Among other things, grand jury records and transcripts are protected52 as is the
testimony of witnesses.53 Reports which summarize or analyze materials presented to the grand
jury are also protected.54
Under the original Rule 6(e), the sole exception to the requirement of judicial approval
involved disclosure to “attorneys for the government for use in the performance of their duties.”

46

E.g., Fed. R. Crim. P. 6 advisory committee’s note (Second Prelim. Draft 1944) (reprinted in Drafting History of
the Felderal Rules of Criminal Procedure vol. IV, 20 (Madeleine J. Wilken & Nicholas Triffin eds. 1991)).
47
241 F. 524 (D.R.I. 1917).
48
Id. at 526 (citations omitted).
49
See generally Brenner & Lockhart, supra note 15, at § 8.4.
50
In re Motions of Dow Jones & Co., 142 F.3d 496, 499 (C.A.D.C.1998) (quoting SEC v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 628
F.2d 1368, 1382 (D.C.Cir.1980) (en banc); Fund for Constitutional Gov't v. National Archives & Records Serv., 656
F.2d 856, 869 (D.C.Cir.1981)).
51
In re Grand Jury Matter 682 F.2d 61, 63 (3d Cir. 1982)
52
Brenner & Lockhart, supra note 15, at § 8.4.1.
53
Id. § 8.4.3.
54
Id. § 8.4.3.
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This exception (hereafter referred to as the “government-attorney exception”)was entirely
consistent with the doctrine of grand jury secrecy for it was intended to allow disclosure to
persons who were already entitled to be present in the grand jury room.55
In 1977, Rule 6(e) was amended to allow disclosure without judicial approval to “such
government personnel as are deemed necessary by an attorney for the government to assist an
attorney for the government in the performance of such attorney’s duty to enforce criminal
law.”56 Rule makers justified the disclosure based on the inability of government attorneys to
adequately conduct grand jury investigations without the help of additional government
personnel.57 In a sense, the government personnel are merely extensions of the government
attorney.58 Under this exception (hereafter referred to as the “law-enforcement exception”), such
personnel are only permitted to use grand jury materials to assist the attorney in enforcing federal
criminal law.59 The obligation of secrecy is imposed upon them, and any knowing violation of
this obligation may be considered a contempt of court.60 Further, the government attorney is
required to promptly notify the court of any disclosure and to specify the government personnel
to whom disclosure was made.61
The 1977 amendment also expressly provided for the sanction of contempt for the
unauthorized disclosure of grand jury materials.62 This provision was intended in part to “allay
the concerns of those who fear that such prosecutorial power will lead to misuse of the grand
55

Fed. R. Crim. P. 6 advisory committee’s note (“Government attorneys are entitled to disclosure of grand jury
proceedings, other than the deliberations and the votes of the jurors, inasmuch as they may be present in the grand
jury room during the presentation of evidence.”)
56
Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(A)(ii) (amended 2002).
57
Fed. R. Crim. P. 6 advisory committee’s note.
58
See generally S. Rep. 95-354, at 6 (July 20, 1977) (reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 527, 530) (“Attorneys for the
Government in the performance of their duties with a grand jury must possess the authority to utilize the services of
other government employees.”).
59
Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(B).
60
Fed. R. Crim P. 6(e)(7).
61
Fed. R. Crim P. 6(e)(3)(B).
62
Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(2) (“A knowing violation of Rule 6 may be punished as a contempt of court.”). The current
version of this provision is found at Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(7).
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jury to enforce non-criminal Federal laws.”63
In 1983, Rule 6(e) was amended to permit government attorneys to share grand jury
materials with other federal grand juries.64 Again, this exception (hereafter referred to as the
“grand-juror exception”) is not inconsistent with the doctrine of grand jury secrecy for the grand
jurors to whom the information is disclosed are bound by their oaths of secrecy.65
Finally, in 1985, Rule 6(e) was amended to clarify that state and local government
personnel are included within the definition of government personnel to whom disclosure by a
government attorney is permitted.66 To additionally safeguard grand jury secrecy, rulemakers
required the government attorney making the disclosure to warn the government personnel,
federal, state, or local, of the obligation of secrecy.67
2. U.S. v. Sells Engineering, Inc.68: A Narrow Interpretation
Perhaps the most significant interpretation of Rule 6(e) was provided by the United States
Supreme Court in United States v. Sells Engineering, Inc.69 In that case, the Court was asked to
determine whether government attorneys working for the Civil Division of the Department of
Justice could access grand jury materials for the purpose of preparing a civil suit.70 The
Government first argued that as the attorneys for the Civil Division fell within the category of
“attorneys for the government,” such materials could be automatically disclosed under Rule
6(e)(3)(A)(i), the government-attorney exception.71 The Court agreed that attorneys for the Civil

63

S. Rep. 95-354, at 8 (1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 527, 531).
Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(iii) (2000) (current version at Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(C)).
65
Fed. R. Crim. P. 6 advisory committee’s note.
66
Fed. R. Crim P. 6(e)(3)(A)(ii) (amended 2002).
67
Fed. R. Crim P. 6(e)(3)(B).
68
463 U.S. 418.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 420.
71
Id. at 427.
64
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Division do fall within the class of “attorneys for the government.”72 Nonetheless, the Court
concluded that the Government was not entitled to automatic disclosure.73 Specifically, the
Court held that “[t]he policies of Rule 6 require that any disclosure to attorneys other than
prosecutors be judicially supervised rather than automatic.”74
In so holding, the Court noted that the government-attorney exception only permits
disclosure “‘in the performance of such attorney’s duty.’”75 Ultimately, it concluded that
“preparation of a civil suit by a Justice Department attorney who had no part in conducting the
related criminal prosecution” does not fall within that category of duties covered by the
exception.76 The Court’s decision to narrowly interpret Rule 6(e)’s government-attorney
exception was driven by “the strong historic policy of preserving grand jury secrecy.”77 It found
“disclosure for civil use unjustified by the considerations supporting prosecutorial access”—in
sum, grand juries can function perfectly well without such disclosure.78
But the Court did not end its analysis with this finding. It took great pains to articulate
the “affirmative mischief” such disclosure could cause.79 The Court was greatly concerned by
the prospect that broad disclosure would increase “the risk of inadvertent or illegal release to
others” and “render[] considerably more concrete the threat to the willingness of witnesses to
come forward and to testify fully and candidly.”80 It also expressed concern for “the integrity of

72

Id. at 427-28 (noting “Rule 54(c) defines the phrase expansively, to include authorized assistants to the Attorney
General”; 28 U.S.C. § 515(a) provides that the Attorney General may direct any attorney employed by the
Department to conduct ‘any king of legal proceeding, civil or criminal, including grand jury proceedings . . . .’”).
73
Id. at 435.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 428.
76
Id. at 428-35.
77
Id. at 428.
78
Id. at 431.
79
Id. at 431.
80
Id. at 432.
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the grand jury itself,” fearing that the institution might be used for purposes other than criminal
investigation and that such misuse might be difficult to ascertain.81
The Government also sought disclosure under then Rule 6(e)(3)(c)(i),82 which permitted
court-ordered disclosure “‘preliminary to or in connection with a judicial proceeding.’”83 In so
doing, the Government sought to distinguish cases involving disclosure to government officials
from those involving private parties, arguing that when government officials seek disclosure “‘in
furtherance of their responsibility to protect the public weal,’” they should not be required to
make a showing of particularized need.84 At the heart of the Government’s argument was the
idea that “‘disclosure of grand jury materials to government attorneys typically implicates few, if
any, of the concerns that underlie the policy of grand jury secrecy.’”85 While acknowledging
that the Government’s argument had “some validity,” the Court found it to be “overstated,”86 and
refused to waive application of the particularized-need standard to government officials.87
Thus, prior to the events of 9/11, the only persons to whom grand jury materials could be
disclosed without prior judicial approval were government attorneys involved in federal criminal
investigations, government personnel assisting government attorneys in federal criminal
investigations, and federal grand jurors. Each of these groups is essential to the functioning of a
81

Id. at 432-33. A third concern was that the “use of grand jury materials by government agencies in civil or
administrative settings threatens to subvert the limitations applied outside the grand jury context on the
Government’s power of discovery and investigation.” Id. at 433.
82
This exception is currently contained in Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(E)(i).
83
Id. at 442.
84
Id. at 443. Specifically, the Government sought to avoid the application of the standard articulated in Douglas
Oil:
“Parties seeking grand jury transcripts under Rule 6(e) must show that the material they seek is
needed to avoid a possible injustice in another judicial proceeding, that the need for disclosure is
greater than the need for continued secrecy, and that their request is structured to cover only
material so needed. . . .”
Id. at 443 (quoting Douglas Oil Co. of California v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 222-23 (1979)
(citations omitted)).
85
Id. at 444-45.
86
Id. at 445.
87
Id. at 444-45. The Court did note that “the standard itself accommodates any relevant considerations, peculiar to
government movants, that weigh for or against disclosure in a given case.” Id. at 445.
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federal grand jury and each has an obligation of secrecy under Rule 6(e)(2).88 All others seeking
disclosure, including government officials, were required to obtain judicial approval by making a
showing of particularized need.89

88

On September 11, 2001, Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure read as follows:
(e) Recording and disclosure of proceedings.
(1) Recording of proceedings. All proceedings, except when the grand jury is deliberating or
voting, shall be recorded stenographically or by an electronic recording device. An unintentional
failure of any recording to reproduce all or any portion of a proceeding shall not affect the validity
of the prosecution. The recording or reporter's notes or any transcript prepared therefrom shall
remain in the custody or control of the attorney for the government unless otherwise ordered by
the court in a particular case.
(2) General rule of secrecy. A grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a
recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or
any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(A)(ii) of this subdivision shall not
disclose matters occurring before the grand jury, except as otherwise provided for in these rules.
No obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. A
knowing violation of Rule 6 may be punished as a contempt of court.
(3) Exceptions.
(A) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters occurring before the grand jury,
other than its deliberations and the vote of any grand juror, may be made to-(i) an attorney for the government for use in the performance of such attorney's duty; and
(ii) such government personnel (including personnel of a state or subdivision of a state) as
are deemed necessary by an attorney for the government to assist an attorney for the government
in the performance of such attorney's duty to enforce federal criminal law.
(B) Any person to whom matters are disclosed under subparagraph (A)(ii) of this paragraph
shall not utilize that grand jury material for any purpose other than assisting the attorney for the
government in the performance of such attorney's duty to enforce federal criminal law. An
attorney for the government shall promptly provide the district court, before which was impaneled
the grand jury whose material has been so disclosed, with the names of the persons to whom such
disclosure has been made, and shall certify that the attorney has advised such persons of their
obligation of secrecy under this rule.
(C) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters occurring before the grand jury
may also be made-(i) when so directed by a court preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding;
(ii) when permitted by a court at the request of the defendant, upon a showing that grounds
may exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment because of matters occurring before the grand
jury; or
(iii) when the disclosure is made by an attorney for the government to another federal grand
jury; or
(iv) when permitted by a court at the request of an attorney for the government, upon a
showing that such matters may disclose a violation of state criminal law, to an appropriate official
of a state or subdivision of a state for the purpose of enforcing such law.
If the court orders disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury, the disclosure shall be
made in such manner, at such time, and under such conditions as the court may direct.
(D) A petition for disclosure pursuant to subdivision (e)(3)(C)(i) shall be filed in the district
where the grand jury convened. Unless the hearing is ex parte, which it may be when the petitioner
is the government, the petitioner shall serve written notice of the petition upon (i) the attorney for
the government, (ii) the parties to the judicial proceeding if disclosure is sought in connection with
such a proceeding, and (iii) such other persons as the court may direct. The court shall afford those
persons a reasonable opportunity to appear and be heard.
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C.

Rule 6(e) After 9/11

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 changed lives and laws. Within fifteen
months after the attacks, Congress had enacted two massive pieces of legislation aimed at
addressing the terrorist threat: the USA PATRIOT Act of 200190 and the Homeland Security Act
of 2002.91 Each significantly amended the provisions of Rule 6(e).
1. The USA PATRIOT Act Amendments
As an immediate response to the tragic events of 9/11, Congress enacted sweeping
legislation in the form of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, intended to “deter and punish terrorist
acts in the United States and around the world, to enhance law enforcement investigatory tools,
and for other purposes.”92 A key function of the legislation was to break down the traditional

(E) If the judicial proceeding giving rise to the petition is in a federal district court in another
district, the court shall transfer the matter to that court unless it can reasonably obtain sufficient
knowledge of the proceeding to determine whether disclosure is proper. The court shall order
transmitted to the court to which the matter is transferred the material sought to be disclosed, if
feasible, and a written evaluation of the need for continued grand jury secrecy. The court to which
the matter is transferred shall afford the aforementioned persons a reasonable opportunity to
appear and be heard.
(4) Sealed indictments. The federal magistrate judge to whom an indictment is returned may
direct that the indictment be kept secret until the defendant is in custody or has been released
pending trial. Thereupon the clerk shall seal the indictment and no person shall disclose the return
of the indictment except when necessary for the issuance and execution of a warrant or summons.
(5) Closed hearing. Subject to any right to an open hearing in contempt proceedings, the court
shall order a hearing on matters affecting a grand jury proceeding to be closed to the extent
necessary to prevent disclosure of matters occurring before a grand jury.
(6) Sealed records. Records, orders and subpoenas relating to grand jury proceedings shall be
kept under seal to the extent and for such time as is necessary to prevent disclosure of matters
occurring before a grand jury.
89
The requirement that a person seeking disclosure of grand jury materials establish a “particularized need” also
applies when a defendant seeks disclosure pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(ii). E.g., U.S. v. Broyles, 37 F.3d
1314, 1318 (8th Cir.1994). Accord Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. U.S., 360 U.S. 395, 400 (1959) (applying the
original version of Rule 6(e) and concluding, “the burden . . . is on the defense to show that 'a particularized need'
exists for the [grand jury] minutes which outweighs the policy of secrecy”).
90
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism
(USA PATRIOT Act) Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 203, 115 Stat. 272, 272 (2001).
91
Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 895, 116 Stat. 2135, 2256-57 (2002).
92
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism
(USA PATRIOT Act) Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 203, 115 Stat. 272, 272 (2001).
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barriers between federal law enforcement officials and the intelligence community.93 Bipartisan
support existed for the idea that increased cooperation between law enforcement and the
intelligence community was vital to preventing future terrorist acts.94 In the words of Senator
Orrin Hatch, “In this new war, terrorists are a hybrid between domestic criminals and
international agents. We must lower the barriers that discourage our law enforcement and
intelligence agencies from working together to stop these terrorists. These hybrid criminals call
for new, hybrid tools.”95 In a span of less than eighteen months, these tools were integrated into
the war on terrorism.
a. The Amendment of Rule 6(e)
The USA PATRIOT Act included a provision amending Rule 6(e) to allow96 disclosure of
grand jury materials without judicial approval:97
when the matters involve foreign intelligence or counterintelligence (as defined in
section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a)),98 or foreign
intelligence information (as defined in clause (iv) of this subparagraph),99 to any
93

See generally Jim McGee, An Intelligence Giant in the Making; Anti-Terrorism Law Likely to Bring Domestic
Apparatus of Unprecedented Scope, The Washington Post AO4, A04 (Nov. 11, 2001).
94
E.g., 147 Cong. Rec. S10560 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2001) (statement of Senator Orrin Hatch); id. at S10556
(statement of Senator Patrick Leahy) (noting “few would disagree that information learned in a criminal
investigation that is necessary to combating terrorism or protecting the national security ought to be shared with the
appropriate intelligence and national security officials”).
95
Id. at S10560.
96
Under the new provision disclosure “may” be made. Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(A)(amended 2002) (current version
at Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(D)). Disclosure is not required. But see infra notes 116 to 122 and accompanying text.
97
The House of Representatives’ version of this bill would have required judicial intervention. H.R. Rpt. 107236(I), 107th Cong., 1st Sess., § 353 (Oct. 11, 2001).
98
“The term ‘foreign intelligence’ means information relating to the capabilities, intentions, or activities of foreign
governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities.” 50
U.S.C. § 401a(2) (2000 & Supp. I 2002). “The term ‘counterintelligence’ means information gathered and activities
conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on
behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international
terrorist activities.” Id. § 401a(2).
99
Clause (iv) defines “foreign intelligence information” as meaning:
(I) information, whether or not concerning a United States person, that relates to the ability of the
United States to protect against-(aa) actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or an agent of
a foreign power;
(bb) sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign
power; or
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Federal law enforcement, intelligence, protective, immigration, national defense,
or national security official in order to assist the official receiving that information
in the performance of his official duties.”100
Congress included this provision based on the belief thatin the course of criminal
investigations, grand juries might well obtain information that could be used to prevent
terrorist acts.101 However, the definitions used seem to encompass a much broader range
of information, including information that is unrelated to any threat to the United States
or its citizens. For instance, “foreign intelligence” includes information relating to the act
of a foreign person.102 That could include the plans a foreign citizen to take part in a
peaceful protest here or abroad or to buy a loaf of bread.
An argument exists that this new exception (hereafter referred to as the “PATRIOT
intelligence exception”) significantly undermines the doctrine of grand jury secrecy.103 It differs
from other exceptions to Rule 6(e) secrecy in twocritical respects.

First, the PATRIOT

intelligence exception permits prosecutors, acting solely on their own authority, to disclose grand
jury materials to persons who are not involved in the prosecution of federal crimes.104 Unlike

(cc) clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of a foreign
power or by an agent of foreign power; or
(II) information, whether or not concerning a United States person, with respect to a foreign power
or foreign territory that relates to-(aa) the national defense or the security of the United States; or
(bb) the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.
100
Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(i)(V) (amended 2002) (current version at Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(D)).
101
For example, during the floor debate, Senator Bob Graham provided the following hypothetical:
Let me give a couple of hypothetical but eerily-close-to-reality examples. It is likely that there are,
tonight, grand juries meeting at various places in the United States to deal with issues related to
the events of September 11. Witnesses may be providing information-information about training
camps in Afghanistan, ground warfare techniques used by al-Qaida and the Taliban, the types and
quantity of weapons available. This type of information will be critical for the military-critical for
the military now, not 2 years from now when these cases might go to trial.
147 Cong. Rec. at S10566 (statement of Senator Bob Graham).
102
See supra note 98.
103
Irvin B. Nathan & Christopher D. Man, The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 Poses a New Threat to Grand Jury
Secrecy, 9 Bus. Crimes Bull. 1, 1 (February 2002).
104
Id.
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those traditional exceptions granting prosecutors the right to disclose grand jury materials,105 this
exception is not necessary to the proper functioning of the grand jury itself. The function of a
grand jury is to determine whether probable cause exists to believe that a crime has occurred,106
not to determine whether a crime will or might occur in the future. Under the traditional
exceptions, a prosecutor might, for example, instruct an FBI agent to obtain physical evidence
for submission to the grand jury. To achieve the legitimate goal of obtaining the additional
evidence needed by the grand jury to reach a just result, the prosecutor might find it necessary to
disclose grand jury materials to the agent. In short, the disclosure would be made with the intent
to serve the grand jury.
The purpose of the new exception is fundamentally different. Under the PATRIOT
intelligence exception, a prosecutor might, for example, report the existence of a financial link
between a recent immigrant and a suspected terrorist to an immigration official. The
immigration official would not be working for the prosecutor and would not be expected to
report back to the grand jury. Instead, he or she might use the information as part of a
deportation proceeding. In sum, the disclosure of the information would be completely unrelated
to the functioning of the grand jury.
Unlike those traditional exceptions authorizing disclosure for purposes unrelated to the
grand jury function,107 this exception requires no judicial intervention and no showing of
particularized need. Even as the USA Patriot Act was being enacted, Congressional concerns
over the lack of judicial oversight were voiced,108 but Congress’ desire to take swift, decisive
action to prevent another 9/11 outweighed concerns over the Act’s individual components.

105

See supra notes 55 to 67 and accompanying text.
Brenner & Lockhart, supra note 15, at § 3.1.
107
See supra notes 68 to 89 and accompanying text.
108
147 Cong. Rec. at S10556 (statement of Senator Bob Graham).
106
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Second, the PATRIOT intelligence exception provides grand jury information to persons
who are not subject to the same obligation of secrecy imposed upon the other categories of
persons to whom grand jury materials may be disclosed without judicial intervention. Pursuant
to Rule 6(e)(2)(B), grand jurors, attorneys for the government, and persons to whom disclosure is
made under the law-enforcement exception are not permitted to disclose matters occurring before
the grand jury, except as otherwise provided for in the rules. So, for instance, an FBI agent who
receives grand jury materials pursuant to the law-enforcement exception109 is not empowered to
pass along those materials to other persons.
The obligation of secrecy imposed by Rule 6(e)(2) does not apply to persons obtaining
information under the PATRIOT intelligence exception. Instead, Rule 6(e)(3)(D)(i), provides
that federal officials receiving information under the new exception “may use the information
only as necessary in the conduct of that person's official duties subject to any limitations on the
unauthorized disclosure of such information.”110 The USA Patriot Act provided no explicit
sanction for officials who violate this limitation.111 Indeed, as a practical matter, the prospects of
identifying persons in violation are poor for no record of those receiving information is filed with
the court overseeing the grand jury.112
b. The Adoption of Information-Sharing Guidelines

109

Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(A)(ii).
See also 50 U.S.C. § 403-5d (Supp. I 2002) (authorizing the sharing of foreign intelligence and
counterintelligence information “obtained as part of a criminal investigation” with federal intelligence officials, etc.
and mandating that such information be used “only as necessary in the conduct of the person’s official duties subject
to any limitations on the unauthorized disclosure of such information”).
111
A court might attempt to rely upon its inherent powers to order a contempt sanction. See supra notes 39, 43 and
accompanying text.
112
Rule 6(e)(3)(D)(ii) merely requires that “within a reasonable time after such disclosure, an attorney for the
government shall file under seal a notice with the court stating the fact that such information was disclosed and the
departments, agencies, or entities to which the disclosure was made.” Its failure to require prosecutors to
specifically identify the federal officials to whom disclosure is made contrasts sharply with the requirement that
government personnel to whom disclosure is made pursuant to Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(ii) be identified. Fed. R. Crim. P.
6(e)(3)(B).
110
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Congress did provide a mechanism for limiting disclosure.113 Section 905(a) of the USA
PATRIOT Act required the Attorney General to develop guidelines for the sharing of
information by federal law enforcement agencies with the federal intelligence community.114
These guidelines were to be promulgated after consultation with the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency.115
On September 23, 2002, Attorney General John Ashcroft issued the required
guidelines.116 The new guidelines do little to safeguard grand jury secrecy. If anything, they
make it more likely that grand jury materials will be disclosed. While the PATRIOT intelligence
exception117 permits disclosure to federal intelligence officials, “these guidelines require
expeditious disclosure.”118
113

The USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 905(a), 115 Stat. 272, 388-90.
Id.
115
Id.
116
Memo, from John Ashcroft, U.S. Atty. Gen., to Heads of Dept. of Just. Components & Heads of Fed. Depts. &
Agencies with L. Enforcement Resps., Guidelines Regarding Disclosure to the Director of Central Intelligence and
Homeland Security Officials of Foreign Intelligence Acquired in the Course of a Criminal Investigation (Sept. 23,
2002).
117
Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(D).
118
Memo, from John Ashcroft, supra note 116, at Guideline 2 (emphasis added). Specifically Guideline 2 states:
Law Enforcement Information Subject to Mandatory Disclosure. Subject to any exceptions
established by the Attorney General in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence (the
"Director") and the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, section 905(a) and these
guidelines require expeditious disclosure to the Director, the Assistant to the President for
Homeland Security or other members of the U.S. intelligence community or homeland security
agencies as are designated under paragraph 4, infra, of foreign intelligence acquired in the course
of a criminal investigation conducted by Federal Law Enforcement Agencies.
a. As used herein, the term “foreign intelligence” is defined in section 3 of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. § 401a) as: “information relating to the capabilities, intentions, or
activities of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign
persons, or international terrorist activities.”
b. The term “section 905(a) information” means foreign intelligence acquired in the course of a
criminal investigation.
c. Section 203(d) of the USA PATRIOT Act, provides that: “Notwithstanding any other law, it
shall be lawful for foreign intelligence or counterintelligence (as defined in section 3 of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. § 401a)) or foreign intelligence information
obtained as part of a criminal investigation to be disclosed to any Federal law enforcement,
intelligence, protective, immigration, national defense, or national security official in order to
assist the official receiving that information in the performance of his official duties." Thus, no
other Federal or state law operates to prevent the sharing of such information so long as
disclosure of such information will assist the Director and the Assistant to the President for
Homeland Security in the performance of their official duties, and Federal Law Enforcement
114
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The guidelines do allow for “exemptions from the mandatory disclosure obligation.”119
Requests for exemption “must be submitted by the department, component or agency head in
writing [i.e., the United States Attorney] with a complete description of the facts and
circumstances giving rise to the need for an exception and why lesser measures such as use
restrictions are not adequate.”120 The Attorney General makes the final determination as to
whether an exemption is warranted.121 Exemptions are considered on a case-by-case basis.122
The standard created by the guidelines is a mirror opposite of that applied in every other
situation involving prosecutorial release of grand jury materials. Instead of a presumption of
secrecy, a presumption of disclosure exists. Rather than requiring a particularized showing of
the need for disclosure, the guidelines require a particularized showing of the need for secrecy.
The guidelines also allow for the “originator” of the information to place some
restrictions on its use.123 As a general rule, information disclosed under the guidelines will be
disclosed “free of any originator controls or information use restrictions.”124 However, use of
grand jury materials may be restricted “to comply with notice and record keeping requirements
and to protect sensitive law enforcement sources and ongoing criminal investigations and
prosecutions.”125 Any restrictions on use “shall be no more restrictive than necessary to
accomplish the desired effect.”126 Unless the information contained within the grand jury

Agencies shall, notwithstanding any other law, expeditiously disclose to the Recipients (as
defined below) section 905(a) information.
119
Id. Guideline 9.
120
Id. Guideline 9(c).
121
Id. Guideline 9(b). In making this determination, the Attorney General is to consult with the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security. Id.
122
Id.
123
Id. Guideline 8.
124
Id.Guideline 8(a).
125
Id.Guideline 8(c).
126
Id. Guideline 8(b)(i).

20

materials relates to potential terrorism or weapons of mass destruction, the prosecuting official
assigned to the case must be consulted prior to disclosure.127
Again, this standard runs counter to that applied to every other prosecutorial release of
grand jury materials. In the absence of use restrictions, as long as the recipients of the materials
believe that disclosure is necessary in the conduct of their duties, they are free to pass them along
to anyone.128 This “second generation” of recipients did not exist under the exceptions in
existence prior to 9/11. Those who received grand jury materials from a prosecutor were
prohibited by their own obligation of secrecy from disclosing them to a second generation of
recipients.129 Neither Rule 6(e) nor the guidelines purport to limit the use of grand jury materials
by second generation recipients. Once they reach this point, any pretext of secrecy is a thing of
the past.
One other feature of the guidelines is worthy of note. The Attorney General has
distinguished between the treatment of materials relating to “a potential terrorism130 or WMD
[Weapons of Mass Destruction131] threat to the United States homeland, its critical infrastructure,

127

Id. Guideline 5(c). The disclosure must be made “within 48 hours after the prosecutor is initially notified.” Id.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(iii). Some protection may be afforded to “United States persons” under Exec. Or.
12333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59941, 59950 (Dec. 4, 1981), which places limitations on the ability of intelligence agencies “to
collect, retain or disseminate information concerning United States persons.” Before disclosing grand jury materials
identifying United States persons to federal intelligence officials, the prosecutor must label the materials as
containing identifying information. Memo. from John Ashcroft, U.S. Atty. Gen., to Heads of Dept. Components,
Guidelines for Disclosure of Grand Jury and Electronic, Wire, and Oral Interception Inforn1ation Identifying
United States Persons (Sept. 23, 2002). Under certain circumstances, identifying references to United States
persons may be deleted by the receiving agency. Id.
129
See generally supra notes 55 to 67 and accompanying text.
130
“Terrorism Information” is defined as follows:
All information relating to the existence, organization, capabilities, plans, intentions,
vulnerabilities, means of finance or material support, or activities of foreign or international
terrorist groups or individuals or threats posed by such groups or individuals to the United States,
United States persons, or United States interests, or to those of other nations, or to
communications between such groups or individuals, or information relating to groups or
individuals reasonably believed to be assisting or associated with them.
Memo. supra n.116 , at Guideline 5(a)(i).
131
“Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Information” is defined as follows:
All information relating to conventional explosive weapons and non-conventional
128
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key resources (whether physical or electronic) or to United States persons or interests
worldwide” and the treatment of other grand jury materials subject to disclosure under Rule the
PATRIOT intelligence exception. The former must be disclosed to the proper authorities
“immediately,” while the latter must be disclosed “as expeditiously as possible.”132 When grand
jury materials are released under the “as expeditiously as possible” standard, a period of fortyeight hours exists during which the prosecutor may identify use restrictions or seek an exception
to the requirement of disclosure from the Attorney General.133
c. The Use of the PATRIOT Intelligence Exception
Any question as to whether the PATRIOT intelligence exception would be used was
quickly answered. Between September 11, 2001 and July 26, 2002, approximately forty
disclosures of federal grand jury materials containing foreign intelligence information were
made.134 These disclosures involved thirty-nine separate grand juries.135
Interestingly, twenty-seven of the disclosures during this period involved the use of prePATRIOT ACT procedure.136 The exact procedures used are unclear. On September 20, 2002,
the Justice Department informed the House Committee on the Judiciary that “grand jury material
was shared under Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(ii),” the law-enforcement exception, which permits disclosure
without court approval to government personnel needed to help prosecutors enforce federal

weapons capable of causing mass casualties and damage, including chemical, biological,
radiological and nuclear agents and weapons and the means of delivery of such weapons.
Id. Guideline 5(a)(ii).
132
Id. Guideline 5(a).
133
Id. Guideline 5(a),(c).
134
Ltr. From Daniel J. Bryant, Asst. Atty. Gen., to the Hon. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chairman, Comm. on the
Jud., U.S. H.R., Questions Submitted by the House Judiciary Committeee to the Attorney General on USA Patriot
Act Implementation 1 (July 26, 2002).
135
Ltr. From Daniel J. Bryant, Asst. Atty. Gen., to the Hon. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chairman, Comm. on the
Jud., U.S. H.R., Follow-up Questions Submitted by the House Judiciary Committeee to the Attorney General on USA
Patriot Act Implementation 1 (Sept. 20, 2002). Presumably, the bulk of these disclosures were made prior to the
enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act.
136
Ltr. From Daniel J. Bryant, Asst. Atty. Gen., to the Hon. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chairman, Comm. on the
Jud., U.S. H.R., Grand Jury Notice Information 1 (Oct. 4, 2002).
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criminal law.137 However, on October 4, 2002, the Justice Department reported that the districts
involved “filed a motion and obtained an order from the court permitting such disclosure.”138
Since the law-enforcement exception permits disclosure without a court order, this
discrepancy is puzzling. It seems that prosecutors either sought court approval of their Rule
6(e)(3)(A)(ii) disclosure as some sort of check on their decision making or sought disclosure
pursuant to Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i),139 which permits court-ordered disclosure. Using either of these
provisions for purposes of sharing information with the intelligence community is
problematic.140
The law-enforcement exception141 might legitimately be used if the prosecutor’s purpose
were to obtain additional information for the federal criminal case under investigation.142 If, for
example, a prosecutor needed the help of the CIA to obtain information about a foreign target to
present to the grand jury, a CIA agent might fall with the category of government personnel to
whom disclosure is permitted. But if the prosecutor’s intent is not to enforce federal criminal
law, but rather to inform the CIA of a threat to national security, the law-enforcement exception
does not apply. In addition, a CIA agent who received grand jury materials under this exception
could not disclose them to others.143 If the intent of the Justice Department in making the

137

Ltr., supra n.135 , at 1.
Ltr., supra n.136 , at 1.
139
The current version of this exception is found at Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(E)(i).
140
Indeed, at least one Senator who supported the amendment of Rule 6(e) did so because she believed that
“[u]nder current law, law enforcement officials involved in a grand jury investigation cannot share
information gathered in the grand jury with the intelligence community, even if that information would
prevent a future terrorist act.” 147 Cong. Rec. at S10592 (statement of Senator Diane Feinstein).
141
Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(A)(ii).
142
The Justice Department explained, “[i]n the context of the 9/11 investigation, grand jury information was shared
with members of numerous JTTFs [Joint Terrorism Task Forces] around the country who participated in the
PENTBOMB [9/11] investigation as well as representatives of the various agencies stationed at SIOC [Strategic
Information and Operations Center]. The reason for this is that it is often necessary to disclose grand jury testimony
to those involved in an investigation to further that investigation.” Ltr., supra note 135, at 1.
143
See supra notes 56 to 60 and accompanying text.
138
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disclosures was to address a threat to national security, an absolute ban on further disclosure
seems unworkable.
In contrast, court-ordered disclosure under Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i), which permits court
ordered disclosure “preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding,” would not
impose an obligation of secrecy upon the recipient.144 Again, however, this exception does not
appear to apply to situations in which the disclosure is intended to protect national security
interests. In United States v. Baggot,145 the United States Supreme Court strictly construed this
language holding, “the Rule contemplates only uses related fairly directly to some identifiable
litigation, pending or anticipated. . . . If the primary purpose of disclosure is not to assist in
preparation or conduct of a judicial proceeding, disclosure under (C)(i) is not permitted.”146
Thus, the fact that “litigation is factually likely to emerge” from an investigation of a threat to
national security would not support disclosure under Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i).147
The remaining disclosures were made under the PATRIOT intelligence exception.
According to the Justice Department, all of the reporting districts148 invoking the new exception
had filed the required notice of disclosure with the court supervising the grand jury through
which the information was obtained.149 No complaints have been received from the supervising
courts as to the timeliness of the notices filed.150

144

The obligation of secrecy imposed by Fed, R. Crim. P. 6(e)(2) applies only to grand jurors, interpreters, persons
recording or transcribing the testimony, prosecutors, and persons to whom disclosure is made under the lawenforcement exception.
145
463 U.S. 476 (1983).
146
Id. at 480.
147
Id.
148
At the time the Justice Department made it report, thirty-six of the thirty-eight districts involved in the disclosure
of intelligence materials had reported. Ltr., supra n. 136, at 1.
149
Id.
150
Id. According to the Justice Department, “[t]he courts supervising the grand juries are responsible for
supervising the filing of notices and for disciplining any failure to file such notices.” Ltr., supra n.135 , at 1. How
the supervising court would ever learn of a failure to file is an open question.
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The Justice Department provided the House Judiciary Committee with a redacted
exemplar151 that provides some valuable insights into how the exception is being used.152 The

151

Id.
The notices are provided in the form of pleadings filed under seal. Id. The text of the sample notice reads as
follows:
152

Pursuant to Section 203(a) of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat.
272, 279 (2001), codified as Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(C), the undersigned attorney for the
government hereby provides notice to the Court regarding the disclosure to certain Federal
departments, agencies, and entities of criminal investigative information that may include “matters
occurring before” the above-captioned grand jury regarding xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
and related criminal activity, as follows:
1. Grand juries empaneled in this district have issued subpoenas and engaged in other
investigative activities in conjunction with xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
and related criminal activity. To the extent that information relating to the grand juries’s [sic]
activities constitutes “matters occurring before the grand jury” within the meaning of Rule 6(e)(2)
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, it may not be disclosed “except as provided for” under
the Rules. Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(2).
2. Section 203(a) of the USA PATRIOT Act , which was signed into law on October 26,
2001, amends Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i) to authorize disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury:
(V) when the matters involve foreign intelligence or counterintelligence (as
defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a)) [sic],
or foreign intelligence information (as defined in clause (iv) of this
subparagraph), to any Federal law enforcement, intelligence, protective,
immigration, national defense, or national security official in order to assist the
official receiving that information in the performance of his official duties.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(i)(V).
3. The investigation into the September 11 attacks and related criminal activity involves such
“foreign intelligence or counterintelligence and foreign intelligence information. Moreover, the
sharing of information developed during the investigation assists a variety of “Federal law
enforcement, intelligence, protective, immigration, national defense, [and national] security
officials in the performance of their official duties. Consequently, criminal investigative
information, which may include matters occurring before grand juries, has been disclosed and will
continue to be disclosed to such officials. Of course, an official who receives such information
“may use it only as necessary in the conduct of that person’s official duties subject to any
limitations on the unauthorized disclosure of such information.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(iii).
4. The amended rule requires that, “[w]ithin a reasonable time after such disclosure an
attorney for the government shall file under seal a notice with the court stating the fact that such
information was disclosed and the departments, agencies, or entities to which disclosure was
made.” Id. Unlike the disclosure required in other contexts, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(B), in
matters involving these sort of intelligence interests, which may (as in this case) involve literally
thousands of Federal law enforcement and other officials, the rule does not require notice to name
each individual official to whom grand jury information has been disclosed, only their
“departments, agencies, or entities.”
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most striking feature of the exemplar is the sheer breadth of the disclosure. The Court is
informed that the intelligence interests in question “involve literally thousands of Federal law
enforcement and other officials.”153 The recipients include everyone from the CIA to the Social
Security Administration Inspector General.154 Such widespread dissemination of grand jury
materials is unprecedented. Under the new exception, prosecutors are not even constrained by
the need to list the individuals receiving the information.155 Clearly, the passage of the USA
PATRIOT Act ushered in a new era in the use of federal grand jury materials.
2. The Homeland Security Amendments
The new era continued with the passage of yet more far-reaching legislation in the form
of the Homeland Security Act of 2002.156 While much of the public’s attention to this Act was

5. Accordingly, the undersigned attorney for the government hereby notifies the Court that
information relating to the above-captioned grand jury investigations, which may include “matters
occurring before the grand jury,” has been and will be disclosed to the following Federal
departments, agencies, and entities pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(C)(i)(V):
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)
(j)
(k)
(l)
(m)
(n)

Department of Justice (including Federal Bureau of Investigation).
Department of Treasury.
Department of Defense.
Department of State.
Department of Transportation.
Department of Energy.
Postal Inspection Service.
Central Intelligence Agency.
National Security Agency.
National Security Council.
Naval Criminal Investigative Service
Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Federal Aviation Administration.
Social Security Administration Inspector General.

6.

Pursuant to Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(iii), this notice is filed UNDER SEAL.

Id. at Attachment to Follow-up Question 4 (footnotes omitted).
153
Id.
154
Id.
155
The Justice Department termed the requirement under Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(ii) that prosecutors provide a list of every
individual to whom information is disclosed “onerous and a diversion of resources from investigative activity.” Ltr.,
supra n.135 , at 1.
156
Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 895, 116 Stat. 2135, 2256-57 (2002).
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directed towards provisions creating a new cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security, the
Act also included provisions thatpurported to amend Rule 6(e) yet again.157
The concern that the improvements in information sharing wrought by the enactment of
the USA PATRIOT Act did not go far enough prompted this amendment.158 Specifically,
legislators expressed their concern that the USA PATRIOT Act failed to bring state and local
officials into the information loop.159 Such officials were believed to be at the vanguard of the
war on terrorism.160 It was the sense of Congress “that Federal, State, and local entities should
share homeland security information to the maximum extent possible.”161 Legislators also
voiced their concerns that the USA PATRIOT Act failed to address the problem of domestic
terrorism.162
a. The Purported Amendment of Rule 6(e)
In some respects, the changes wrought to Rule 6(e) by the USA PATRIOT Act pale in
comparison to those Congress sought to create via the Homeland Security Act. The Homeland
Security Act of 2002 contained additional amendments to Rule 6 that further erode the doctrine
of grand jury secrecy.163
The most significant amendment creates a new exception to the obligation of grand jury
secrecy which allows disclosure without judicial approval:

157

Id. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 incorporated the provisions of an earlier bill, H.R. 4598, the “Homeland
Security Information Sharing Act.”
158
E.g., 148 Cong. Rec. H3939 (June 26, 2002) (statement of Rep. F. James Sensenbrenner).
159
E.g., id.
160
Id. Congress specifically found that “[s]ome homeland security information is needed by State and local
personnel to prevent and prepare for terrorist attack” and that “State and local personnel have capabilities and
opportunities to gather information on suspicious activities and terrorist threats not possessed by Federal agencies.”
Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 891(b)(4),(8), 116 Stat. 2135, 2252 (2002).
161
Id. § 891(c).
162
148 Cong. Rec. at H3939. See also H.R. Rpt. 107-534 § 6 (June 25, 2002) (“Domestic threat information is
included because it is not always clear whether threats to public safety result from international or domestic
terrorism threats. The anthrax attacks are one example of where the origin of that attacks is not clear.”).
163
116 Stat. at 2256-57.
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when matters involve a threat of actual or potential attack or other grave hostile
acts of a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, domestic or international
sabotage, domestic or international terrorism, or clandestine intelligence gathering
activities by an intelligence service or network of a foreign power or by an agent
of a foreign power, within the United States or elsewhere, to any appropriate
federal, state, local, or foreign government official for the purpose of preventing
or responding to such a threat.164
Congress has again created an exception that fundamentally differs from the traditional
exceptions165 by permitting prosecutors to disclose grand jury materials to persons who are not
intimately involved in the prosecution of federal crimes.166 In contrast to those traditional
exceptions controlling disclosure to persons unrelated to the grand jury function,167 the new
exception (hereafter referred to as the “Homeland Security exception”) requires no judicial
intervention and no showing of particularized need.
Several aspects of this new exception are disquieting. First, the Act ill defines the types
of information subject to disclosure. In drafting the amendments contained within the USA
PATRIOT Act, Congress defined the categories of information that may be disclosed—it
provided specific definitions for “foreign intelligence,” etc.168 These definitions may be broad,
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116 Stat. at 2256.
The Act also sought to amend the language of existing Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(ii) to include personnel of a foreign
government among those to whom an attorney for the government may disclose grand jury materials when needed to
assist in enforcing federal criminal law. Id. A prosecutor disclosing grand jury materials to a foreign official under
this provision would be required to provide the official’s name to the court that impaneled the grand jury. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 6(e)(3)(B). Foreign officials receiving grand jury materials pursuant to this exception would have an
obligation of secrecy under existing Rule 6(e)(2).
In addition, the Act sought to amend the language of existing Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i)(I) to expressly allow a
court to order disclosure “upon request by an attorney by the government when sought by a foreign court or
prosecutor for use in an official criminal investigation.” 116 Stat. at 2256. In essence, this amendment clarified that
at least some foreign proceedings qualify as “judicial proceedings” under Rule 6. Along the same lines, the Act
sought to amend existing Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i)(IV) to expressly permit a court to order disclosure of a violation of
foreign criminal law to a foreign official for the purpose of enforcing that law. 116 Stat. at 2256. This amendment
was believed necessary because “even when the Government [made] an appropriate showing to the court (i.e., a
showing similar to that required for disclosure of grand jury material in a domestic proceeding), the rule as . . .
written [did] not expressly authorize courts to order disclosure. As a consequence, the U.S. prosecutor sometimes
[was forced to] re-subpoena the same information from the original sources.” H.R. Rpt. 107-534 at § 6.
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See supra notes 55 to 67 and accompanying text.
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Id.
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See supra notes 68 to 89 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
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but they do place some limitation on disclosure. The Homeland Security Act provides no such
definitions. For example, a term like “domestic terrorism” could be susceptible to varying
interpretations. If a prosecutor learns via grand jury testimony of a planned anti-war sit-in may
the prosecutor inform intelligence officials of the identity of its planners?169 The question of
where “ordinary” crime ends and “domestic terrorism” begins is left unanswered.170
Second, the Act provides no limitation on the category of government official to whom
information may be disclosed. It may be given to any “appropriate” official.171 Congressional
testimony172 and debate173 centered on the need to involve state and local officials in the war on
terrorism, but the new exception also permits disclosure to foreign officials. Nothing in the
Congressional record explains this decision. Indeed, there is no discussion of the unique risks
disclosure to non citizens and residents might pose to the grand jury process.
Once more, the language of the Homeland Security exception contrasts sharply with that
of the PATRIOT intelligence exception, which provides a list of approved categories.174 Given
that the Homeland Security exception is intended to prevent acts such as terrorism and sabotage,
and that the circumstances surrounding such acts would be highly variable, the desire to allow
some leeway as to the selection of the appropriate official is understandable. Nonetheless, the
utter lack of boundaries creates unprecedented access to grand jury materials.
169

Leaving decisions as to when disclosure is warranted in the hands of individual prosecutors is bound to lead to
inconsistencies in interpretation.
170
Under federal criminal law, “domestic terrorism” is defined as
activities that-- (A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws
of the United States or of any State; (B) appear to be intended--(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian
population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to
affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and (C)
occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
18 U.S.C. § 2331(5) (2000 & Supp I 2002).
116 Stat. at 2256.
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E.g., Subcomm. on Crime H.R. Jud. Comm., H.R.4598, The Homeland Security Information Sharing Act,
Cong. Test., 2002 WL 20317655 (June 4, 2002) (statement of Rep. Saxby Chambliss).
173
E.g., 148 Cong. Rec. at H3941-H3942 (statement of Rep. Anthony Weiner).
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Legislators did express some concern over the disclosure of grand jury information.175
However, they believed that the Act contained adequate safeguards to protect grand jury
secrecy.176 As with persons receiving grand jury materials under the PATRIOT intelligence
exception, the obligation of secrecy imposed by Rule 6(e)(2) does not apply to persons obtaining
information under the Homeland Security exception. Still, some limitations on use exist.
Officials receiving grand jury materials pursuant to this exception may use it only as needed in
the conduct of their duties.177 They must use it for the purpose specified by the exception, “to
prevent or respond to a threat.”178 Joint guidelines to be promulgated by the Attorney General
and the Director of the CIA may impose additional limitations on use by state, local, and foreign
officials.179 Such officials may be punished for contempt of court for any violation of that
obligation.180
The effectiveness of these safeguards remains to be seen. As with the PATRIOT
intelligence exception,181 there is no requirement that prosecutors identify recipients of grand
jury materials to the court overseeing the grand jury. Prosecutors need only file a notice with the
court indicating that the information was disclosed and identifying the entity receiving the
materials.182 Further, with the exception of the contempt sanction created for violations of the
joint guidelines discussed above,183 Congress again failed to expressly grant the courts the power
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E.g., 148 Cong. Rec. at H3942 (statement of Rep. Anthony Weiner) (“I share the concerns that some raised in
committee that we do not want this information to chip away at the confidentiality of the grand jury.”)
176
Id. at H3939 (statement of Rep. F. James Sensenbrenner) (noting, “[t]he information may only be disclosed for
the specified purpose of preventing and responding to a threat. Additionally, recipients may only use the disclosed
information in the conduct of their official duties as is necessary, and they are subject to the restrictions for
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116 Stat. at 2256.
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to impose the sanction of contempt.184 And how a court might be expected to impose contempt
sanctions without knowing the identity of the person or persons to whom disclosure was made is
a mystery.
b. The Current Status of Rule 6(e)
The Homeland Security Act amendments were supposed to become effective sixty days
after the date of enactment.185 However, in drafting the amendments, Congress failed to
consider the amendment and restructuring of Rule 6(e) that came into effect on December 1,
2002.186 This restructuring made the amendments incapable of execution.187 President George
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Again, the courts may possess the inherent power to impose this sanction. . See supra notes 39, 43
, 111 and
accompanying text.
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Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 4, 116 Stat. 2142 (2002).
186
As of the writing of this article, Fed. R. Crim P. 6(e)(2),(3) reads as follows:
(2) Secrecy.
(A) No obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with Rule
6(e)(2)(B).
(B) Unless these rules provide otherwise, the following persons must not disclose a matter
occurring before the grand jury:
(i) a grand juror;
(ii) an interpreter;
(iii) a court reporter;
(iv) an operator of a recording device;
(v) a person who transcribes recorded testimony;
(vi) an attorney for the government; or
(vii) a person to whom disclosure is made under Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(ii) or (iii).
(3) Exceptions.
(A) Disclosure of a grand-jury matter--other than the grand jury's deliberations or any grand
juror's vote--may be made to:
(i) an attorney for the government for use in performing that attorney's duty;
(ii) any government personnel--including those of a state or state subdivision or of an
Indian tribe--that an attorney for the government considers necessary to assist in performing
that attorney's duty to enforce federal criminal law; or
(iii) a person authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3322.
(B) A person to whom information is disclosed under Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(ii) may use that
information only to assist an attorney for the government in performing that attorney's duty to
enforce federal criminal law. An attorney for the government must promptly provide the court
that impaneled the grand jury with the names of all persons to whom a disclosure has been
made, and must certify that the attorney has advised those persons of their obligation of secrecy
under this rule.
(C) An attorney for the government may disclose any grand-jury matter to another federal
grand jury.
(D) An attorney for the government may disclose any grand-jury matter involving foreign
intelligence, counterintelligence (as defined in 50 U.S.C. § 401a), or foreign intelligence
information (as defined in Rule 6(e)(3)(D)(iii)) to any federal law enforcement, intelligence,
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protective, immigration, national defense, or national security official to assist the official
receiving the information in the performance of that official's duties.
(i) Any federal official who receives information under Rule 6(e)(3)(D) may use the
information only as necessary in the conduct of that person's official duties subject to any
limitations on the unauthorized disclosure of such information.
(ii) Within a reasonable time after disclosure is made under Rule 6(e)(3)(D), an attorney
for the government must file, under seal, a notice with the court in the district where the grand
jury convened stating that such information was disclosed and the departments, agencies, or
entities to which the disclosure was made.
(iii) As used in Rule 6(e)(3)(D), the term "foreign intelligence information" means:
(a) information, whether or not it concerns a United States person, that relates to the
ability of the United States to protect against-• actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or its
agent;
• sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign power or its agent; or
• clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of a
foreign power or by its agent; or
(b) information, whether or not it concerns a United States person, with respect to a
foreign power or foreign territory that relates to-• the national defense or the security of the United States; or
• the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.
(E) The court may authorize disclosure--at a time, in a manner, and subject to any other
conditions that it directs--of a grand-jury matter:
(i) preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding;
(ii) at the request of a defendant who shows that a ground may exist to dismiss the
indictment because of a matter that occurred before the grand jury;
(iii) at the request of the government if it shows that the matter may disclose a violation
of state or Indian tribal criminal law, as long as the disclosure is to an appropriate state, statesubdivision, or Indian tribal official for the purpose of enforcing that law; or
(iv) at the request of the government if it shows that the matter may disclose a violation
of military criminal law under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, as long as the disclosure
is to an appropriate military official for the purpose of enforcing that law.
(F) A petition to disclose a grand-jury matter under Rule 6(e)(3)(E)(i) must be filed in the
district where the grand jury convened. Unless the hearing is ex parte--as it may be when the
government is the petitioner--the petitioner must serve the petition on, and the court must afford a
reasonable opportunity to appear and be heard to:
(i) an attorney for the government;
(ii) the parties to the judicial proceeding; and
(iii) any other person whom the court may designate.
(G) If the petition to disclose arises out of a judicial proceeding in another district, the petitioned
court must transfer the petition to the other court unless the petitioned court can reasonably
determine whether disclosure is proper. If the petitioned court decides to transfer, it must send to
the transferee court the material sought to be disclosed, if feasible, and a written evaluation of the
need for continued grand-jury secrecy. The transferee court must afford those persons identified in
Rule 6(e)(3)(F) a reasonable opportunity to appear and be heard.
Along with restyling Rule 6(e), the 2002 amendments contained some substantive changes that are
worthy of note. Under Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(iii), a prosecutor may disclose grand jury materials to an
attorney for the government for purposes of enforcing civil forfeiture laws and civil banking laws
under 18 U.S.C. § 3322. This provision was added to ensure that the amendments to Rule 6 did not
supercede 18 U.S.C. § 3322. Fed. R. Crim. P. 6 GAP Rpt. 2002 amends. Underlying section 3322 is
the idea “because all civil forfeiture actions are now recognized as law enforcement functions, grand
jury information should be available to government attorneys for their use in all civil forfeiture cases.”
See generally H.R. Rpt. 105-358(I) § 8 (Oct. 30, 1997). Also, Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(ii) now expressly
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W. Bush has indicated that he plans to seek technical amendments from Congress that will
permit the provisions to go into effect.188
The simple fact that Congress amended Rule 6(e) without taking into account its planned
restructuring underscores the haste with which it reached its decision to alter centuries-old
policies. Now is an opportune moment for Congress to reflect on the changes it has wrought.
Before considering the technical amendments sought by the President, it would be prudent for
Congress to revisit the post 9/11 amendments, considering both their constitutionality and their
impact upon the functioning of the grand jury.
II. Grand Jury Secrecy and the Fifth Amendment
The Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees,
“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury.” The parameters of this right have yet to be fully
defined. In particular, the United States Supreme Court has never directly ruled on whether the
right to secrecy of grand jury proceedings is implicit in a person’s right to indictment by a grand
jury. The examination of whether Congress should rethink the recent amendments to Rule 6(e)
begins with an analysis of whether grand jury secrecy has constitutional underpinnings. Given
the magnitude of change they create, the recent amendments to Rule 6(e) should compel
Congress (if not the courts) to ponder this thorny issue.
A. Costello v. United States: The Final Word on Grand Jury Rights?
In Costello v. United States,189 the Supreme Court provided its clearest statement of the rights
guaranteed by the Grand Jury Clause. The defendant in that case, Frank Costello, was indicted
recognizes that to enforce federal criminal law a prosecutor may need to disclose information to
government personnel of an Indian tribe.
187
The renumbering of the sections within Rule 6(e) made it impossible to make the requested insertions.
188
George W. Bush, Statement on the Signing of H.R. 5005, the Homeland Security Act of 2002, 2002 WL
31650677 at 4 (Nov. 25, 2002).
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for and ultimately convicted of willfully attempting to avoid federal income taxes.190 Both
during and after trial, the defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that it was
based solely upon hearsay evidence and thus violated the Grand Jury Clause.191 The United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied his motion and the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.192 In upholding the lower courts’
rulings, the Supreme Court concluded, “An indictment returned by a legally constituted and
unbiased grand jury . . . if valid on its face, is enough to call for trial of the charge on the merits.
The Fifth Amendment requires nothing more.”193
Standing alone, Costello could be read to stand for the proposition that the right to indictment
by a grand jury does not encompass the right to secrecy of grand jury proceedings. If a grand
jury is legally constituted and unbiased and if it issues an indictment, the constitutional
requirements are satisfied. Indeed, a few lower courts have specifically found that the right to
secrecy “was never intended as a safeguard for the interests of the accused,”194 and thus, cannot
be said to be incorporated into the Fifth Amendment rights of the accused.
B. Midland Asphalt Corporation v. United States: Acknowledging the Role of Grand
Jury Secrecy
Treating Costello as the final word on the rights encompassed in the Grand Jury Clause
stretches the Court’s holding too far. Costello addressed the limited question of what the Grand
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Jury Clause requires before a person may be subjected to trial.195 It did not address whether the
Grand Jury Clause contains other requirements that must be satisfied to avoid dismissal of an
indictment. In Midland Asphalt Corporation v. United States,196 the Supreme Court spoke to this
critical distinction.197 The defendants, Midland Asphalt Corporation and Albert C. Litterer,
moved to dismiss the indictment against them on the grounds that the Government had violated
Rule 6(e) by disclosing matters occurring before the grand jury.198 The United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York denied the motion, and on appeal, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dismissed defendants’ appeal on the grounds that “the
indictment was not a ‘final decision’ under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.”199 In affirming the Second
Circuit’s decision, the Supreme Court held, “There is a ‘crucial distinction between a right not to
be tried and a right whose remedy requires the dismissal of charges.’”200
Consistent with the Costello decision, the Court noted that “a right not to be tried” exists
“when there is no grand jury indictment.”201 The Court went on to hold, “Only a defect so
fundamental that it causes the grand jury no longer to be a grand jury, or the indictment no
longer to be an indictment gives rise to the constitutional right not to be tried.202 The “isolated
breach of the traditional secrecy requirements” by the Government was deemed insufficient to
satisfy either of these requirements.203 Nonetheless, theMidland Asphalt Court’s ruling left open
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the possibility that violations of the secrecy requirements incorporated into Rule 6(e) might
provide the basis for a reversal of a conviction on appeal.204
Perhaps, most importantly, the Court clarified the protections afforded by the Grand Jury
Clause, acknowledging, “Undoubtedly the common-law protections traditionally associated with
the grand jury attach to the grand jury required by [the Grand Jury Clause]—including the
requisite secrecy of grand jury proceedings.”205 In essence, the Court seemed to indicate that
defendants have a Fifth Amendment right to be indicted by a grand jury that functions under the
traditional, common-law rules of secrecy.206 Given that the Supreme Court has “consistently . . .
recognized that the proper functioning of our grand jury system depends upon the secrecy of
grand jury proceedings,”207 such a rule would make sense.
C. Exploring the Interests Protected by Grand Jury Secrecy
Understanding the constitutional underpinnings of the right to secrecy is impossible
without understanding the function of the grand jury. The grand jury’s “establishment in the
Constitution 'as the sole method for preferring charges in serious criminal cases' indeed 'shows
the high place it (holds) as an instrument of justice.'”208 In recent years, the Supreme Court has
stressed that the grand jury serves “the ‘dual function of determining if there is probable cause to
believe that a crime has been committed and of protecting citizens against unfounded criminal
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prosecutions.’"209 “The . . . concern for the grand jury’s dual function underlies the ‘longestablished policy that maintains the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings in the federal
courts.’”210
The Supreme Court has recognized four distinct interests protected by the right to secrecy
in grand jury proceedings.211 One, “if preindictment proceedings were made public, many
prospective witnesses would be hesitant to come forward voluntarily, knowing that those against
whom they testify would be aware of that testimony.”212 Two, “witnesses who appeared before
the grand jury would be less likely to testify fully and frankly, as they would be open to
retribution as well as to inducements.”213 Three, the risk would exist “that those about to be
indicted would flee, or would try to influence individual grand jurors to vote against
indictment.”214 Four, “by preserving the secrecy of the proceedings, we assure that persons who
are accused but exonerated by the grand jury will not be held up to public ridicule.”215
Clearly, not all of these interests implicate the constitutional rights of a defendant.216 But
interests one and two go to the very heart of the grand jury function of shielding the innocent
from prosecution. The system cannot work without witnesses who “feel free to speak the truth
without reserve.”217 The “cloak of silence” covering grand jury proceedings was born in part of

209

Sells Eng’g, Inc., 463 U.S. at 423 (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 686-687, 92 S.Ct. 2646, 2659, 33
L.Ed.2d 626 (1972) (footnote omitted)) (emphasis added). See supra notes 15 to 20and accompanying text.
210
Id. at 424 (quoting Proctor & Gamble, 356 U.S. 677, 681, 78 S.Ct. 983, 986, 2 L.Ed. 1077 (1958) (footnote
omitted). “The grand jury is an English institution, brought to this country by the early colonists and incorporated in
the Constitution by the Founders. There is every reason to believe that our constitutional grand jury was intended to
operate substantially like its English progenitor.” Costello, 350 U.S. at 362. The English grand jury traditionally
“act[ed] in secret.” Id.
211
E.g., Sells Engineering, Inc., 463 U.S. at 424; Douglas Oil Co., 441 U.S. at 218.
212
Id. at 219.
213
Id.
214
Id.
215
Id.
216
Interest three, for example, relates to the public’s interest in determining whether probable cause exists to believe
a crime has been committed.
217
Goodman, 108 F.2d at 519.

37

“the desire to create a sanctuary, inviolate to any intrusion except on proof of some special and
overriding need, where a witness may testify, free and unfettered by fear of retaliation.”218
It is not unreasonable to ask why special protection of grand jury witnesses is warranted.
Today’s grand jury witness may be tomorrow’s trial witness and, therefore, subject to public
questioning. But not every grand jury proceeding results in an indictment, not every indictment
results in a trial,219 and not every trial requires testimony from every grand jury witness. It is far
from certain that any given grand jury witness will ever be asked to testify at trial.
Perhaps more important, the difference in circumstances between an appearance at trial
and an appearance before the grand jury may also justify greater protection.220 Grand jury
witnesses appear unprotected by counsel221 and can be subjected to intense questioning or even
browbeating by prosecutors.222

Prosecutors are allowed to “go fishing” and to seek evidence,

such as hearsay, that would not be admissible at trial.223
“Grand jury secrecy . . . ‘is as important for the protection of the innocent as for the
pursuit of the guilty.’”224 If potential, but unknown, witnesses fear that their grand jury
testimony will be not be protected, they may remain in the shadows, and if known witnesses fear
for their safety or that of friends of family, they may be provide incomplete or inaccurate
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testimony.225 When either of these events takes place, when less than the whole story is told, an
innocent person may stand accused.226 The Grand Jury Clause requires a grand jury that is a real
grand jury with all of its protections, not a grand jury in name only.
Repeated breaches of grand jury secrecy result in systemic injury to the grand jury
process. They are like termites undermining the structure of a building. It is the cumulative
effect of disclosures that ultimately denies grand jury targets their Fifth Amendment right to a
meaningful review by the grand jury. That is arguably why the courts and rulemakers have been
so miserly in recognizing exceptions to the rule of grand secrecy and in granting disclosure
pursuant to those exceptions. If the exceptions are permitted to swallow the rule, the grand jury
process suffers.
To illustrate, if the testimony ofa grand jury witness in Cas e A is disclosed, no injury
may result to the target in Case A. The disclosure may have no impact whatsoever on the
proceedings involving this particular target. But that does not mean that the disclosure is not
harmful. The harm comes over time. As more and more disclosures occur and as the
ramifications of those disclosures gradually become public knowledge, a chilling effect227 sets in.
225

E.g., Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 360 U.S. at 400 (noting, “testimony would be parsimonious if each witness
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Fearing retribution of some sort, a witness in Case X fails to step forward with information about
the identity of the true perpetrator of the crime and another witness tells the grand jury less than
the whole story or flat out lies. The target in Case X becomes the victim of a grand jury system
weakened by breaches of secrecy.
D. Understanding the Dearth of Supreme Court Authority
The dearth of Supreme Court authority directly addressing the existence of a
constitutional right of grand jury secrecy can be explained by the types of cases it has heard.
Some cases have simply not implicated secrecy interests relating to the constitutional rights of
defendants. For instance, Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States228 and Dennis v. United
States229 involved motions in which the accused sought to obtain grand jury materials. Since any
constitutional right to secrecy arises only from the Grand Jury Clause and since the Grand Jury
Clause creates rights belonging to the accused, not the Government, these rights would not
ordinarily come into play in a case in which the accused sought disclosure.230 In other cases, the
Court was able to reach a finding that disclosure was not permitted under Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 6(e),231 and thus, no need existed to examine any constitutional
requirements.

benefit, such as a job or a contract, “in retaliation for speech may chill speech on matters of public concern . . . .”
E.g., Board of County Commissioners v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996). In the case of actual and potential
grand jury witnesses, the threat that their testimony may be disclosed to those who would cause them harm may
deter witnesses from speaking freely and truthfully.
228
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384 U.S. 855, 868 (1966).
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Of course, even in the absence of any constitutional protection, the Court may consider the “long-established
policy of secrecy” in interpreting Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co., 360 U.S. at 398-401.
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Baggot, 463 U.S. at 477-80 (holding disclosure of grand jury materials to the IRS to allow it to determine tax
liability was not permitted under Rule 6(e)); Illlinois v. Abbott & Associates, 460 U.S. 557, 566-568 (1983)
(finding disclosure of grand jury materials to state attorney general without court approval and without a showing of
particularized need would not comport with the requirements of Rule 6(e)); U.S. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S.
677, 681-82 (1958) (concluding defendants in a civil antitrust action were not entitled to discovery of a grand jury
transcript in the possession of the Government).
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In the last fifty years, only one Supreme Court decision, United States v. John Doe, Inc.
I,232 has ordered disclosure pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e). That case
involved a request by attorneys in the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice to disclose
grand jury materials to the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York and to
five named attorneys within the Civil Division.233 The purpose of this disclosure was to allow
attorneys from the Antitrust Division to consult with their counterparts234 before filing a civil
action.235
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York concluded that
the Department of Justice had satisfied the requirements of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
6(e)(3)(C)(i) by showing “a particularized need for disclosure,” but the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, deeming the disclosure “unnecessary.”236 After
reviewing the record, the Supreme Court concluded that the District Court correctly applied the
“particularized need” standard and did not abuse its discretion in allowing disclosure.237
The John Doe, Inc. Icase provided the Court with perhaps its best opportunity to
examine the relationship between the right of grand jury secrecy and the right to a grand jury
created by the Grand Jury Clause. Still, even this case did not require the Court to do so. It
involved the application of Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i),238 which requires a court order to obtain
discovery239 and which requires “’a strong showing of particularized need’ before disclosure is
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permitted.”240 Even if the Court were to have expressly recognized the constitutional
underpinnings of the right to secrecy, the test it applied would have likely been the same.241
Indeed, in applying the test, the Court specifically examined whether the disclosure would
seriously threaten the recognized secrecy interests.242
In sum, the United States Supreme Court has never directly addressed the constitutional
underpinnings of the doctrine of grand jury secrecy because the need to do so has never arisen.
The common law and the pre-9/11 version of Rule 6(e) provided safeguards to the doctrine at
least equal to those required by the Fifth Amendment. If faced with the issue of whether a
material breach of the traditional protection afforded grand jury secrecy violates the Constitution,
the Supreme Court should conclude that it does do so. To rule otherwise would strip the right to
indictment by a grand jury of all meaning.
E. Examining the Parameters of Grand Jury Secrecy
Although the Supreme Court should recognize a Fifth Amendment right of grand jury
secrecy, it should also recognize that any such right is not absolute.243 The common-law
protections attaching to the grand jury required by the Fifth Amendment have always allowed for
disclosure under certain circumstances.244 To determine the test for the constitutionality of a
disclosure, one must scrutinize these protections, both as articulated by the courts and as codified
in Rule 6(e).
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A review of the existing authorities indicates that for the disclosure of grand jury
materials to comport with the Fifth Amendment two criteria must be satisfied. One, a
“compelling necessity” for the disclosure must be established.245 Two, barring extraordinary
circumstances, disclosure must be judicially supervised.246
1. The Requirement of Compelling Necessity
The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co. provides an
excellent starting point for examining the common-law protections:
The grand jury as a public institution serving the community might suffer if those
testifying today knew that the secrecy of their testimony would be lifted tomorrow. This
'indispensable secrecy of grand jury proceedings,' must not be broken except where there
is a compelling necessity. There are instances when that need will outweigh the
countervailing policy. But they must be shown with particularity.247
From Proctor & Gamble, it can be gleaned that a person seeking disclosure of grand jury
materials bears the burden of establishing a “compelling necessity” for the disclosure.248 Such a
requirement is entirely consistent with the common law as created by the courts and reflected in
pre-9/11 Rule 6(e). The analysis of whether a compelling necessity exists requires the
application of a two-pronged test.249 Historically, matters occurring before a federalgrand jury
have been subject to disclosure in only a handful of circumstances: to serve the grand jury;250 to
protect defendants against prosecutorial misconduct;251 to further the ends of justice in a judicial
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proceeding;252 and to assist state and Indian tribal officials in the prosecution of state and Indian
tribal crimes.253 In each of these circumstances, disclosure may be required to protect an
important societal interest. Not every category of need is sufficient to outweigh the policy of
protecting grand jury materials.254 Thus, a person seeking disclosure must first establish that his
or her need is of the right kind.255
But merely establishing that a request falls within one of the recognized categories does
not establish that disclosure is appropriate. A person seeking disclosure must prove a
particularized need exists for disclosure in the case at bar.256 “The particularized need test is one
of degree . . . .”257 In essence, the courts have said that the need for the grand jury materials
must be real.
For example, both private parties and governmental officials258 seeking grand jury
materials for use in another judicial proceeding “must show the material they seek is needed to
avoid a possible injustice in [the] judicial proceeding, that the need for disclosure is greater than
the need for secrecy, and that the request is structured to cover only the material so needed.”259
Satisfying this burden is not easy—to overcome the need for secrecy, the party seeking
disclosure must establish non- disclosure would result in great prejudice.260 Simply showing that
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the grand jury materials sought are “relevant” is insufficient.261 In determining whether
disclosure is necessary, a court may weigh the likelihood that the information could be obtained
through other means.262
Nonetheless, the “particularized need” standard has always had some flexibility.263 It
involves a balancing of interests, which by its very nature requires that the facts be considered
on a case-by- case basis. For instance, “a court might reasonably consider that disclosure to
Justice Department attorneys poses less risk of further leakage than would disclosure to private
parties or the general public.”264 Additionally, “under the particularized need standard, the
district court may weigh the public interest, if any, served by disclosure to a governmental body
. . . .”265
The sole exception to the requirement of a showing of particularized need arises when a
prosecutor seeks to disclose information to other government attorneys involved in federal
criminal investigations,266 government personnel assisting government attorneys in such
investigations,267 or federal grand jurors.268 Sharing information with members of these groups
falls within the definition of disclosure in the sense that it involves “revealing such information
to other persons,”269 but it does not involve a revelation to a person not intimately involved in
the functioning of the grand jury. Two of the three groups, government attorneys and grand
jurors, have the right to be present in the grand jury room.270 The third, government personnel
assisting government attorneys, is in some ways akin to a group that has long had access to the
261
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grand jury room, court stenographers.271 Like the stenographer, the FBI agent charged with
gathering evidence serves as the handmaid of the grand jury.
Further, since persons within these groups may use the information disclosed only for
purposes of furthering a grand jury investigation, absent a belief that a need exists for their
assistance, there would be no logical reason for a prosecutor to disclose it. In short, a
particularized need must exist or there would be no disclosure. The circumstancessurrounding
this exception are truly unique.
A finding of compelling necessity is clearly required for disclosure to comport with the
requirements of the Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The question then becomes
who is responsible for making such a finding.
2. The Need for Judicial Review
Throughout history, the decision to disclose grand jury materials has been in the hands of
the judiciary.272 To understand why this power has been placed in the hands of the judiciary,
rather than the prosecutor, one must understand the unique status of the grand jury. “[T]he grand
jury is mentioned in the Bill of Rights, but not in the body of the Constitution. It has not been
textually assigned, therefore, to any of the branches described in the first three Articles. It ‘‘is a
constitutional fixture in its own right.’’”273
But the independence of the grand jury is a fragile thing, dependent upon a delicate
balance of judicial and prosecutorial oversight. “A grand jury is clothed with great independence
in many areas, but it remains an appendage of the court, powerless to perform its investigative
function without the court's aid, because powerless itself to compel the testimony of
271

Id.
See supra notes 38, 44, 55 to 67, and 88to 89and accompanying text. See also Illinois, 460 U.S. at 567. (“There
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witnesses.”274 If the grand jury is an appendage of the court, it is also an appendage of the
prosecutor for it is powerless to indict without the consent of the prosecutor.275 The Fifth
Amendment's “constitutional guarantee [of the right to indictment by a grand jury] presupposes
an investigative body ‘acting independently of either prosecuting attorney or judge.’”276 It is the
fact that judge and prosecutor must share control that guarantees the grand jury’s independence.
The grand jury is intended to serve as a shield against prosecutorial abuse,277 not a
prosecutor’s private tool. In the words of the old maxim, “Absolute power corrupts absolutely.”
The involvement of the courts serves as a check on any abuse of power.

For example, acting

under the auspices of a court, a prosecutor may subpoena a witness or a record on the grand
jury’s behalf.278 Nonetheless, the court retains the right to “quash or modify a subpoena on
motion if compliance would be ‘unreasonable or oppressive.’”279
In the context of disclosures, it only makes sense that the courts be given the power to
decide when the veil of secrecy may be lifted. Grand juries derive their subpoena power from
the courts280 and while broad, this power is not unlimited.281 Grand juries are intended to
exercise this power to obtain evidence relating to whether probable cause exists to believe a
crime has been committed.282 They may not exercise this power for other purposes.283 “In short,
if grand juries are to be granted extraordinary powers of investigation because of the difficulty
and importance of their task, the use of those powers ought to be limited as far as reasonably
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possible to the accomplishment of the task.”284 When information obtained via a grand jury
subpoena is sought for a purpose other than that for which it was intended (i.e., when disclosure
is sought), the ultimate source of the subpoena power, the court, should be the final arbiter. If it
is not, the grand jury does become the tool of the prosecutor and a potential for misuse arises.285
The court is also the body best suited to undertake the balancing of interests required to
determine whether disclosure is warranted. “A court of law . . . is the sole means of protecting
individual privacy from the airing of private judgment unguided by standards of due process.”286
If decision making were left in the hands of prosecutors, there would be no hearing, no
presentation of evidence, no record, no guiding precedent, and no possibility of appeal. Most
important, there would be no neutral decision maker. Weighing the various interests involved
when disclosure of grand jury materials is at issue is a delicate task.287 The decision to remove
the veil of grand jury secrecy should not be made on an ad hoc basis.
Again, the sole exception to the requirement that disclosure be subject to judicial
approval arises when a prosecutor seeks to disclose information to other government attorneys
involved in federal criminal investigations,288 government personnel assisting government
attorneys in such investigations,289 or federal grand jurors.290 As discussed above, the
circumstances giving rise to this exception are unique.291 A prosecutor is the best judge of the
amount and type of investigative support needed to conduct a grand jury investigation. In
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addition, “interlocutory appeal of issues disruptive of a grand jury investigation are not
favored.”292 The sheer number of requests would overwhelm the system.
Based on the foregoing, to comport with the Fifth Amendment right of grand jury
secrecy, the disclosure of grand jury materials must be the result of a compelling necessity and it
must be judicially approved.
III. Rule 6(e), the Constitution, & Sound Public Policy
The exceptions to the doctrine of grand secrecy created by the USA PATRIOT Act293 and
the Homeland Security Act of 2002294 fundamentally differ from the traditional exceptions to
this doctrine.295 These permanent additions to the legal landscape were enacted in haste and
buried deep within massive bills. They were a gut reaction to tragic events. But good law rarely
results from gut reactions. If Congress intends to permanently alter the grand jury system that is
older than our nation itself, it should do so with thought and great care.
The 340 plus page USA PATRIOT Act was conceived, written, and enacted within six
weeks of the attacks of September 11. The typical committee hearings and debates surrounding
legislation of this scope (or any scope for that matter) were missing.296 Indeed, in the immediate
aftermath of the attacks, only the most courageous of legislators dared voice dissent for fear of
being branded unpatriotic. Surely, this is not the careful deliberation envisioned by the framers
of our Constitution.
292
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During times of turmoil, the rights enshrined in our Constitution face their greatest
threat.297 “In such periods the times seem so different, so out of joint, the threats from within or
without seem so unprecedented, that the Constitution itself is perceived by many persons as
anachronistic, or at least rigidly, unrealistically formalistic.”298 Congress must be ever aware of
the dangers of allowing momentary fears to drive public policy.
The President has already called upon Congress to save the Homeland Security exception
from oblivion by enacting technical amendments.299 Rather than apply a simple patch to Rule
6(e), Congress should take the opportunity to review and repair any damage inflicted by the
recent amendments. It should examine the PATRIOT intelligence exception and the Homeland
Security exception under the lens of the Constitution and the lens of sound public policy.
A. The PATRIOT Intelligence Exception
A careful study of the PATRIOT intelligence exception reveals that its application results
in disclosures causing systemic injury to the grand jury process. As written and applied, the
exception violates the Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment.300 Even if the constitutional
problems are ignored, sound public policy reasons exist for reworking this exception.301
1. The Fifth Amendment Analysis
To satisfy the Fifth Amendment, any disclosure must be justified by a compelling
necessity and must be judicially supervised.302 The PATRIOT intelligence exception sanctions
disclosures that satisfy neither criterion. It permits a prosecutor to disclose “any grand-jury
matter involving foreign intelligence, counterintelligence . . . , or foreign intelligence information
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. . . to any federal law enforcement, intelligence, protective, immigration, national defense, or
national security official to assist the official receiving the information in the performance of that
official's duties.”303
Under the two-pronged compelling necessity test, the disclosure sought must be of a kind
that serves an important societal interest,304 and the need for disclosure must be shown with
particularity.305 The PATRIOT intelligence exception almost certainly satisfies the first prong of
this test. Although disclosure for purposes of promoting national security has never been
included among the recognized categories of disclosure, society’s interest in protecting the
nation and its citizens against hostile acts, such as terrorism and sabotage, can hardly be less
significant than its interest in the enforcement of public or private rights in a civil action, a longrecognized category of disclosure.306 Few would argue that if grand jury testimony uncovers a
legitimate threat to the security of the nation, it should not be revealed to the proper authorities.
But the PATRIOT intelligence exception does not satisfy the second prong of the test. It
does not require persons seeking disclosure to show a particularized need. This exception is
written in the broadest possible terms—disclosure is not limited to instances in which the United
States is faced with some sort of threat, immediate or otherwise. For example, under the
definition of “foreign intelligence” incorporated into the exception,307 a prosecutor would be
permitted to report a foreign student’s membership in a particular mosque to the F.B.I. or the
C.I.A. The exception does not require any evidence of wrongdoing. If you happen to be a non-
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U.S. citizen, any of your activities may be reported to the listed federal officials whether they
have any need for the information or not.
It is not simply the language of the PATRIOT intelligence exception that is troubling—
none of the pre-9/11 exceptions contained in Rule 6(e) expressly require a showing of
particularized need—the more troubling aspect of this exception is the manner in which it has
been interpreted. The interpretation of this exception by the Department of Justice as reflected in
the information-sharing guidelines promulgated by the Attorney General supports the idea that a
showing “particularized need” is not required.308 In fact, the guidelines make disclosure
mandatory.309 If information falls under the categories described in Rule 6(e), it “shall be
shared.”310 In the long history of the doctrine of grand-jury secrecy, no exception has ever been
used to mandate disclosure.
The vast number of disclosures mandated by the guidelines is unprecedented. To
illustrate, as discussed above,311 the broad definition of “foreign intelligence” covers every act by
a foreign citizen, here or abroad. If the mandate provided by the guidelines is to be followed to
the letter, a prosecutor would be charged with reporting a non-citizen’s trip to the grocery for
milk and bread. As directed by Congress,312 the Department of Justice is creating a training
program that will help prosecutors and other law enforcement officials identify foreign
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intelligence information,313 but there is no reason to believe that the Department will ignore the
language of Rule 6 and instruct prosecutors to more narrowly define this term.
The guidelines do permit a prosecutor to petition the Attorney General for an
exemption.314 However, the focus appears to be on protecting criminal investigations, not on
balancing the various interests involved.315 No one seems to be watching out for the interests of
grand jury targets. A presumption of disclosure exists.316 In sum, as interpreted by the Attorney
General, the Patriot intelligence exception not only permits disclosure without a showing of
compelling need, it endorses such disclosure.
The PATRIOT intelligence exception also fails to satisfy the criterion that any disclosure
be judicially supervised.317 The decision to disclose is completely in the hands of the Justice
Department. Indeed, the court under whose authority the evidence was gathered by the grand
jury is not so much as given a list of those persons to whom the information is disclosed.318 The
exception contains no mechanism for preventing its misuse.
The PATRIOT intelligence exception creates a material breach of the protection afforded
grand jury secrecy by the Fifth Amendment. The failure to require a showing of particularized
need and the failure to require judicial supervision create a situation in which enormous numbers
of disclosures can, have,319 and will be made. The cumulative effect of these disclosures will be
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to chill the participation of grand jury witnesses, and thereby cause systemic injury to the grand
jury process.320
2.

The Public Policy Analysis

Even setting aside the issue of its constitutionality, strong public policy arguments exist
for the amendment of the PATRIOT intelligence exception. The collective wisdom of nearly a
millennium has been that secrecy is “indispensable” to grand jury proceedings.321 “[W]hen
disclosure is permitted, it is to be done ‘discretely and limitedly.”322 The PATRIOT intelligence
exception permits disclosure that is hardly discrete and far from limited.323 This exception
permits so many disclosures that it threatens to swallow the rule of secrecy. Upon closer
examination, Congress will discover its national security objectives could be met without
resorting to such a drastic alteration of the grand jury system.
There can be little doubt that under some circumstances, the societal interest in national
security outweighs the societal interest in grand jury secrecy. But that is not always the case.
Every piece of information that falls within the broad definitions of foreign intelligence or
counterintelligence or foreign intelligence information is not vital (or even relevant) to national
security. The PATRIOT intelligence exception lacks a reasonable mechanism for separating the
wheat from the chafe.
The most troubling aspect of this exception is the complete absence of judicial
supervision.324 First, the lack of judicial supervision makes it more likely that intelligence
information obtained in the course of ordinary grand jury investigations will be disclosed. Quite
simply, there is no one there to say “no” to disclosure based on lack of relevancy or need. In
320
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fact, the information-sharing guidelines issued by the Attorney General in effect prohibit anyone
from saying “no” to disclosure based on such considerations.325
Second, the lack of judicial supervision creates the temptation on the part of the Justice
Department to abuse the grand jury system.326 Instead of using the powers of the grand jury to
determine whether probable cause exists to believe that a crime has taken place, prosecutors
could begin using the grand jury as a tool of the intelligence community.
The information-sharing guidelines already provide the Director of the CIA with a direct
role in the disclosure process. They foster an unhealthy entanglement between the Justice
Department and the CIA. The Director is charged with helping the Attorney General establish
any formalized exceptions to the rule of disclosure,327 assisting in the design of a training
curriculum which will allow law enforcement officials to identify intelligence information,328
and consulting with the Attorney General on decisions relating to whether to exempt specific
materials from disclosure.329 Further, Guideline 6 permits recipients of information to request
“additional information,” “clarification,” or “amplification.”330 If a prosecutor knows that the
CIA wishes additional facts on a matter unrelated to the grand jury’s criminal investigation,
directing questions on that matter to a witness would be all too easy.331
Information sharing between federal law enforcement agencies and intelligence agencies
may well be necessary to safeguard national security, but such sharing could be fostered without
the excessive entanglement created by the PATRIOT intelligence exception. The dangers to our
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civil rights posed by such entanglement are well documented.332 The simple requirement of
judicial supervision could prevent federal law enforcement agencies and intelligence agencies
from heading down a very slippery slope.
The question then becomes whether any valid reason exists for omitting such a
requirement from the PATRIOT intelligence exception. Several different justifications have
been set forth for the lack of judicial supervision.333
The initial justifications were provided by members of the Bush Administration.334 The
version of the PATRIOT intelligence exception approved by the House Committee on the
Judiciary required judicial supervision.335 It would have allowed disclosure:
when permitted by a court at the request of an attorney for the government, upon a
showing that the matters pertain to international or domestic terrorism (as defined
in section 2331 of title 18, United States Code) or national security, to any Federal
law enforcement, intelligence, national security, national defense, protective,
immigration personnel, or to the President or Vice President of the United States,
for the performance of official duties.336

A desire for judicial supervision also existed among at least some members of the Senate.
Senator Patrick Leahy proposed to the Administration that judicial oversight of disclosure to
intelligence officials of both wiretap information and grand jury materials was warranted.337 On
September 30, 2001, the Administration agreed to judicial oversight, but within two days it
reneged.338 According to Senator Leahy,
[t]he Administration offered three reasons for reneging on the original deal. First,
they claimed that the involvement of the court would inhibit Federal investigators
and attorneys from disclosing information needed by intelligence and national
security officials. Second, they said the courts might not have adequate security
332
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and therefore should not be told that information was disclosed for intelligence or
national security purposes. And third, they said the President's constitutional
powers under Article II give him authority to get whatever foreign intelligence he
needs to exercise his national security responsibilities.339
The first argument (i.e., that judicial supervision would somehow inhibit the disclosure of
needed information) is specious. If information truly is “needed” by intelligence and national
security officials, there is no reason to believe that a federal judge would not authorize its
disclosure. By way of example, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, which is charged
under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978340 with approving electronic surveillance
and physical searches for intelligence purposes, has rarely refused a request.341 The seeming
distrust of the judiciary by the executive branch is alarming.
The Bush Administration may also have been distrustful of the prosecutors themselves,
fearing that prosecutorswould be unwilling to expend the effor t needed to obtain court approval.
After taking part in the Congressional Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities
339

Id. at S10556. Senator Leahy provided this explanation when discussing the Administration’s reasons for
reneging on its agreement to permit judicial supervision of the disclosure of wiretap information. Id. at S10555S10556. Presumably, it reneged on its agreement to permit judicial supervision of the disclosure of grand jury
information for the same reasons.
340
50 U.S.C. §§ 1802, 1822 (2000).
341
In 1999, “886 applications were made for orders and extensions of orders approving electronic surveillance or
physical search under the Act. the [sic] United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court issued orders in 880
applications granting authority to the Government for the requested electronic surveillance and electronic searches. .
. . . Five applications which were filed in late December 1999 were approved when presented to the Court on
January 5, 2000. No orders were entered which modified or denied the requested authority.” Letter from Janet
Reno, Attorney General of the United States, to the Honorable J. Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the House of
Representatives 1 (Apr. 27, 2000). In calendar year 2000, “1005 applications were made to the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court for electronic surveillance and physical search. The Court approved 1003 of these applications in
2000. Two of the 1005 applications were filed with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court in December 2000
and approved in January 2001. . . . No orders were entered which denied the requested authority.” Letter from John
Ashcroft, Attorney General of the United States, to Mr. L. Ralph Mecham, Director, Administrative Office of the
United States Courts 1 (Apr. 27, 2001). In calendar year 2001, “932 applications were made to the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court for electronic surveillance and physical search. The Court approved 934 applications
in 2001. Two of the 934 applications were filed with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court in December 2000
and approved in January 2001. Two orders and two warrants were modified by the Court. No orders were entered
which denied the requested authority.” Letter from Larry D. Thompson, Acting Attorney General of the United
States, to Mr. L. Ralph Mecham, Director, Administrative Office of the United States Courts 1 (Apr. 29, 2002).
“[A]ll 1228 applications presented to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court in 2002 were approved.” Letter
from John Ashcroft, Attorney General of the United States, to Mr. L. Ralph Mecham, Director, Administrative
Office of the United States Courts 1 (Apr. 29, 2003).

57

before and after the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, Senator Richard Shelby concluded
that the PATRIOT intelligence exception was enacted because the Department of Justice used
Rule 6(e) as an unwarranted excuse to avoid sharing information with the intelligence
community.342 It claimed Rule 6(e) protection for non-grand jury materials.343 “[W]orking from
the assumption that it would be easier to change the law itself than to fix a parochial and
dysfunctional institutional culture that used the Rule as an excuse to prevent all
informationsharing [sic], [Attorney General Ashcroft and Congress] determined simply to
change Rule 6(e) to permit information-sharing with intelligence officials.”344 Indeed, the law
now requires law enforcement officials to share information.345
The fact that prosecutors may have abused Rule 6(e) protections in the past does not
justify a wholesale change in the rule, and it certainly does not justify a change that eliminates
judicial oversight of the process. If the institutional culture within the Department of Justice is
dysfunctional, it must be changed from within.
The second argument (i.e., that the courts lack adequate security to be entrusted with
sensitive information) is equally unsound. First, the courts certainly have as much security as
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many of the federal agencies and departments that will be the recipients of information disclosed
under the PATRIOT intelligence exception. A federal court poses no greater security risk than
does the Social Security Administration. Second, the problem of security could easily be
overcome by creating a court that is akin to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
established under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.346 For example, the chief
judge for each district could appoint a judge to hear all requests under the PATRIOT intelligence
exception. That judge could receive special training and could employ heightened security
measures. Appeals could be made to a specialized court of review appointed by the Chief
Justice. Multitudes of ways exist in which any security concerns might be addressed.
The third argument (i.e., that the President could employ powers under Article II to
compel disclosure) begs the question of whether he should do so. The proposition that the
President has an absolute right to go digging through grand jury materials is dubious at best—no
president has ever exercised such a power. Even assuming this power exists, exercising it in the
indiscriminate manner permitted and even mandated under the PATRIOT intelligence exception
would be foolhardy. Our system has checks and balances for a reason. “In fact the whole theory
of [the grand jury’s] function is that it belongs to no branch of the institutional Government,
serving as a kind of buffer or referee between the Government and the people.”347 The President
should and must trust that the courts will recognize his or her needs.348
Another justification washinted at by the Department of Justice in its response to
questions by the U.S. House of Representatives’ Committee on the Judiciary.349 In explaining
346
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how the PATRIOT intelligence exception aids in the information-sharing process, the
Department of Justice noted the “practical difficulties” involved in utilizing the traditional
exceptions.350
For example, in discussing the problems involved with using the law-enforcement
exception, it pointed out that the exception requires a government attorney to provide the court
with the name of each individual receiving information under the exception.351 According to the
Department of Justice, “[i]n the context of the 9/11 investigations and other terrorism
investigations that are national and international in scope and may involve literally thousands of
investigators and dozens of grand juries, this requirement was onerous and a diversion of
resources from investigative activity.”352 If the Department of Justice views merely reporting
information to a court as “onerous,” it likely views obtaining approval for disclosure as
extraordinarily burdensome. It cannot be denied that permitting disclosure without court
approval saves the Department of Justice money. But the Supreme Court has never viewed cost
savings as a valid reason for lifting the veil of grand jury secrecy.353 If the Department of Justice
requires additional clerical or other help that is simply a cost society must bear.
Any “practical difficulties” arising from the time required to obtain court approval could
easily be addressed in the text of the rule. The information-sharing guidelines issued by the
Attorney General already distinguish between the treatment of materials relating to “a potential
terrorism354 or Weapons of Mass Destruction355 threat” and the treatment of other grand jury
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materials subject to disclosure under the PATRIOT intelligence exception by permitting a fortyeight hour delay in the disclosure of the latter.356 When an immediate threat exists to national
security, prosecutors could be permitted to disclose without judicial approval. In contrast, when
time is not of the essence, a fast-track judicial approval procedure could be used.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that no valid justification exists for the absence of
judicial supervision. Congress can easily amend Rule 6(e) to protect important national security
interests without destroying the secrecy that is indispensable to grand jury proceedings.
B. The Homeland Security Exception
An examination of the Homeland Security exception reveals the same constitutional
violations created by the PATRIOT intelligence exception. As written, the exception would
violate the Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment.357 Again, even if the constitutional
issues are ignored, sound public policy reasons exist for redrafting this exception.358 Should
Congress elect to make the technical amendments necessary to revive this exception, it should
also make the substantive amendments necessary to protect the doctrine of grand jury secrecy.
1. The Fifth Amendment Analysis
To satisfy the Fifth Amendment, any disclosure of grand jury materials must be justified
by a compelling necessity and must be judicially supervised.359 The Homeland Security
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exception authorizes disclosures that satisfy neither criterion. This exception permits disclosure
without judicial approval:
when matters involve a threat of actual or potential attack or other grave hostile
acts of a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, domestic or international
sabotage, domestic or international terrorism, or clandestine intelligence gathering
activities by an intelligence service or network of a foreign power or by an agent
of a foreign power, within the United States or elsewhere, to any appropriate
federal, state, local, or foreign government official for the purpose of preventing
or responding to such a threat. 360

Under the two-pronged compelling necessity test, the disclosure sought must be of a kind
that serves an important societal interest,361 and the need for disclosure must be shown with
particularity.362 Little doubt exists that the Homeland security exception satisfies the first prong
of this test. This exception is more narrowly drawn than the PATRIOT intelligence exception in
one important respect. The PATRIOT intelligence exception permits the disclosure of
information that does not relate to a direct threat of some type to the United States. As discussed
above,363 “foreign intelligence” could involve virtually any act by a non-citizen. In contrast, the
Homeland Security exception for the most part focuses on activities, such as attack, sabotage,
and terrorism that do involve a direct threat to public safety. Preventing such activities
unquestionably serves a long-recognized societal interest.364
However, the Homeland Security exception fails to satisfy the second prong of the test
for it permits disclosure without a showing of particularized need. Not every situation
encompassed within the broad terms of the exception involves a real threat to public safety. For
360
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instance, a multitude of actions could be disclosed under the undefined threat of “terrorism.”365
The county sheriff obviously needs to know that there are plans afoot to place a bomb in the
county courthouse, but does not necessarily need to know that there are plans afoot for a peaceful
protest within the courthouse. This exception could easily become a tool used against those who
might voice public dissent.
Too, the exception permits disclosure to a wide range of officials, including everyone
from the President of the United States to the mayor of a village in the middle of Tibet.366 The
question of which official or officials have a genuine need to know about a particular “threat” is
far from clear. In sum, as written, the Homeland Security exception permits disclosure when no
compelling need for disclosure exists.
Since the exception has yet to become effective, it is difficult to predict how it will be
applied.367 Although section 895 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 indicates the Attorney
General and the Director of the CIA will jointly issue guidelines governing the use of grand jury
materials by state, foreign, and local officials who receive such information pursuant to the
Homeland Security exception, it does not require that any guidelines be issued governing the
disclosure of such information.368 Still, there is no reason to believe that the Attorney General
will not follow the precedent set in the interpretation of the PATRIOT intelligence exception by
making disclosure mandatory.
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The Homeland Security exception also fails to satisfy the criterion that any disclosure be
judicially supervised.369 The language of the exception permits unilateral action by prosecutors.
If a substantial threat is imminent, the government’s interest in protecting national security may
well outweigh any right to grand jury secrecy and such unilateral action may be constitutionally
permissible. However, the language of the exception permits unilateral action even in the
absence of an imminent threat. It excludes judicial participation in the decision-making process
when no need for such exclusion exists.
As with the PATRIOT intelligence exception, the court is provided with nothing more
than a vague, after-the-fact notice that “information” was disclosed to a particular department,
agency, or entity.370 No meaningful role exists for the judiciary in this process.
Should Congress enact the technical amendments requested by President Bush and bring
the Homeland Security exception into being, it will set the stage for a material breach of the
protection afforded grand jury secrecy by the Fifth Amendment. Congress’ failure to require a
showing of particularized need and to allow a meaningful role for the courts creates a situation in
which vast numbers of disclosures can and will be made. Again, the cumulative effect of these
disclosures will be to chill the participation of grand jury witnesses, and thereby cause systemic
injury to the grand jury process.371
2.

The Public Policy Analysis

Even assuming that the Homeland Security exception poses no constitutional problems,
strong public policy arguments support its amendment. In creating this exception, Congress took
measures far beyond those necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of preventing and responding
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to threats to our national security. It unnecessarily sacrificed the “public interest” in secrecy.372
Judicious amendment of the Homeland Security exception could protect the doctrine of grand
jury secrecy while actually furthering the goal of preventing and responding to threats to national
security.
Few would disagree with Congress that a homeland security exception should exist in
some form. If information regarding a true threat to national security becomes known during a
grand jury session, it should be disclosed to the proper authorities. No one wants a repeat of the
tragic events of September 11, 2001. Grand jury materials have been disclosed for lesser
reasons.373
But in drafting the Homeland Security exception, Congress made some critical mistakes.
First, it failed to set needed parameters in terms of the types of information that could be
disclosed under the exception. Failing to define terms, such as “terrorism,”374 denies those
seeking to apply the exception much needed guidance and opens the doors to abuse of this
exception. It allows the disclosure of activities that do not pose any threat to national security.
Second, Congress again created a system that has no checks on the use of power by the
executive branch. The judiciary lacks the ability to identify, much less prevent or punish, any
abuses of this exception. Further, “[s]ince the Department of Justice has taken the position that
the intelligence committees of Congress should not be permitted to see any grand jury
information, this means that there is no oversight of what use is made of grand jury material
passed to the Intelligence Community.”375 It is sadly ironic that the same information that is
372
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entrusted to a foreign official may not be shared with the judicial or legislative branches of our
own government.
Certainly, some situations exist in which it would be impracticable to require prosecutors
to seek judicial approval—if a substantial, imminent threat exists, a prosecutor may need to shout
what he or she knows from the rooftops, and the law should permit such disclosures. But not
every situation requires immediate disclosure. Indeed, not every situation requires any
disclosure. As well, there is no reason why prosecutors could not at the very least provide a list
of those receiving information to the court.376
Prosecutors and judges can and should work hand in hand to determine when the public’s
interest in national security outweighs its interest in grand jury secrecy. It should be the role of
the prosecutor to identify information that may evidence a threat and to immediately bring that
information to the attention of the court. It should be the role of the court to quickly weigh all of
the competing interests and to determine whether disclosure is warranted and the conditions
under which it should be made.
Such a weighing of interests benefits all concerned. As discussed above, grand jury
targets have a strong interest in a grand jury system which protects against unwarranted
disclosures,377 but they are not alone in their need for secrecy for “the proper functioning of our
grand jury system depends upon the secrecy of grand jury proceedings.”378 The public and the
government have an interest in maintaining a system in which grand jury witnesses feel free to
step forward and testify “fully and frankly,” and in which targets are not provided the
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opportunity to flee or intimidate witnesses or jurors.379 Secrecy is necessary to the discovery of
the truth.
While the Bush Administration has fought hard to create the new exceptions to the rule of
secrecy, it too apparently recognizes the value of secrecy. Early in 2003, the Administration
reportedly floated legislation that would amend Rule 6(e) yet again to tighten the rule of
secrecy.380 Section 206 of a proposal known as the Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003
would have imposed a requirement of secrecy on grand jury witnesses in some circumstances.381
Although this proposal now appears to have been dropped, it evidences the vital role of the
doctrine of grand jury secrecy to the grand jury system.
Yet another person with a substantial interest in maintaining grand jury secrecy is the
grand jury witness. Under the Homeland Security exception as written, no one protects the
interests of the witness. No one is charged with considering whether the disclosure of the
testimony of a witness might place that witness, or perhaps a relative in a far off land, in danger.
The danger of intimidation, injury, or even death should not be taken lightly—grand jury
tampering does occur.382 Judicial supervision of any proposed disclosure is necessary to protect
grand jury witnesses from harm.
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Id.
382
In the late1970’s the General Accounting Office (GAO) documented “343 grand jury witnesses who had their
identities revealed before any indictments were returned by grand juries, including 5 who were murdered, 10 who
were intimidated, and 1 who disappeared.” Report to the Congress of the United States by the Comptroller General:
380

67

Judicial supervision may even further the goal of obtaining helpful intelligence
information from grand jury witnesses. If the public begins to perceive grand juries as the tool of
the intelligence community, revealing anything and everything, witnesses may withhold
important information out of fear. Limiting disclosures to materials involving truly vital
information may actually help the system to acquire such information.
One cannot dispute that it might be more convenient for the Department of Justice to act
unilaterally in making the decision to disclose, but “’doubtless all arbitrary powers, well
executed, are the most convenient.’”383 “’[Y]et let it be again remembered that delays and little
inconveniences in the forms of justice are the price that all free nations must pay for their liberty
in more substantial matters.’”384
Based on the foregoing, Congress should revive the Homeland Security exception, but in
doing so, should amend this exception to protect the secrecy that is essential to grand jury
proceedings.
IV. A Proposed Amendment to Rule 6(e)
To address the concerns outlined above, I propose that Congress amend Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(2),(3) to read as follows:385
(e) Recording and Disclosing the Proceedings.
(2) Secrecy.
(A) No obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in
accordance with Rule 6(e)(2)(B).
(B) Unless these rules provide otherwise, the following persons must not
disclose a matter occurring before the grand jury:
(i) a grand juror;
(ii) an interpreter;
More Guidance and Supervision Needed over Federal Grand Jury Proceedings 6 (Oct. 16, 1980). Since the GAO
studied only a few of the federal districts, these numbers represent only “the tip of the iceberg.” Id.
383
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 545 (U.S.1884) (Harlan, J. dissenting) (quoting Blackstone, 4 Bl. Comm.
349, 350.).
384
Id. (quoting Blackstone, 4 Bl. Comm. 349, 350.).
385
The substantive changes are underlined.
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(iii) a court reporter;
(iv) an operator of a recording device;
(v) a person who transcribes recorded testimony;
(vi) an attorney for the government; or
(vii) a person to whom disclosure is made under Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(ii)
or (iii).
(3) Exceptions.
(A) Disclosure of a grand-jury matter--other than the grand jury's
deliberations or any grand juror's vote--may be made to:
(i) an attorney for the government for use in performing that
attorney's duty;
(ii) any government personnel--including those of a state or state
subdivision or of an Indian tribe--that an attorney for the government
considers necessary to assist in performing that attorney's duty to enforce
federal criminal law; or
(iii) a person authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3322.
(B) A person to whom information is disclosed under Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(ii)
may use that information only to assist an attorney for the government in
performing that attorney's duty to enforce federal criminal law. An attorney
for the government must promptly provide the court that impaneled the
grand jury with the names of all persons to whom a disclosure has been
made, and must certify that the attorney has advised those persons of their
obligation of secrecy under this rule.
(C) An attorney for the government may disclose any grand-jury matter to
another federal grand jury.
(D) An attorney for the government may disclose any grand-jury matter
when the matter involves information that he or shereasonably believes may
evidence an imminent, substantial threat to the United States homeland, its
critical infrastructure, its key resources (whether physical or electronic), or
its persons or interests worldwide, to any appropriate federal, state, local, or
foreign government official for the purpose of preventing or responding to
such a threat.
(i) Any officialwho receives information under Rule 6(e)(3)(D) may use
that information only as necessary in the conduct of that person's official
duties subject to any limitations on the unauthorized disclosure of such
information.
(ii) Any state, local, or foreign official who receives information
pursuant to Rule 6(e)(3)(D) shall use that information only consistent with
such guidelines as the Attorney General and Director of Central
Intelligence shall jointly issue.
(iii) After a disclosure made pursuant to Rule 6(e)(3)(D), an attorney for
the government must promptly provide the court with a notice containing
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the names of all persons to whom a disclosure has been made, a brief
description of the information disclosed and the reason for the disclosure,
and a certification that the attorney has advised such persons of any
obligation of secrecy under this rule or any applicable guidelines. This
notice shall be filed under seal.
(E) The court may authorize disclosure--at a time, in a manner, and subject
to any other conditions that it directs--of a grand-jury matter preliminarily to
or in connection with a judicial proceeding.
(F) The court may authorize disclosure--at a time, in a manner, and subject
to any other conditions that it directs--at the request of a defendant who
shows that a ground may exist to dismiss the indictment because of a matter
that occurred before the grand jury.
(G) The court may authorize disclosure--at a time, in a manner, and
subject to any other conditions that it directs-- at the request of the
government if it shows that the matter may disclose a violation of state or
Indian tribal criminal law, as long as the disclosure is to an appropriate state,
state-subdivision, or Indian tribal official for the purpose of enforcing that
law.
(H) The court may authorize disclosure--at a time, in a manner, and
subject to any other conditions that it directs--at the request of the
government if it shows that the matter may disclose a violation of military
criminal law under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, as long as the
disclosure is to an appropriate military official for the purpose of enforcing
that law.
(I) The court may authorize disclosure--at a time, in a manner, and subject
to any other conditions that it directs--at the request of the government if it
shows thatthe matter involves information that may evidence a substantial
threat to the United States homeland, its critical infrastructure, its key
resources (whether physical or electronic), or its persons or interests
worldwide, or it shows that such matters involve clandestine intelligence
gathering activities by an intelligence service or network of a foreign power
or by an agent of a foreign power, within the United States or elsewhere, to
any appropriate federal, state, local, or foreign government official for the
purpose of preventing or responding to such a threat or such activities.
(i) Any official who receives information under Rule 6(e)(3)(I) may use
that information only as necessary in the conduct of that person's official
duties subject to any limitations on the unauthorized disclosure of such
information.
(ii) In addition to any conditions imposed by the court, any state, local,
or foreign official who receives information pursuant to Rule 6(e)(3)(I)
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may use that information only consistent with such guidelines as the
Attorney General and Director of Central Intelligence shall jointly issue.
(J) The court may authorize disclosure--at a time, in a manner, and subject
to any other conditions that it directs--at the request of the government if it
shows that such matters involve significant foreign intelligence,
counterintelligence (as defined in 50 U.S.C. § 401a), or foreign intelligence
information (as defined in Rule 6(e)(3)(J)(iii)) to any federal law
enforcement, intelligence, protective, immigration, national defense, or
national security official to assist the official receiving the information in the
performance of that official's duties.
(i) Any federal official who receives information under Rule 6(e)(3)(J)
may use the information only as necessary in the conduct of that person's
official duties subject to any limitations on the unauthorized disclosure of
such information.
(ii) As used in Rule 6(e)(3)(J), the term "foreign intelligence
information" means:
(a) information, whether or not it concerns a United States person, that
relates to the ability of the United States to protect against-• actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign
power or its agent;
• sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign power or its agent;
or
• clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or
network of a foreign power or by its agent; or
(b) information, whether or not it concerns a United States person,
with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates to-• the national defense or the security of the United States; or
• the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.
(K) A petition to disclose a grand-jury matter under Rule 6(e)(3)(E) must
be filed in the district where the grand jury convened. Unless the hearing is
ex parte--as it may be when the government is the petitioner--the petitioner
must serve the petition on, and the court must afford a reasonable
opportunity to appear and be heard to:
(i) an attorney for the government;
(ii) the parties to the judicial proceeding; and
(iii) any other person whom the court may designate.
(L) If the petition to disclose arises out of a judicial proceeding in another
district, the petitioned court must transfer the petition to the other court
unless the petitioned court can reasonably determine whether disclosure is
proper. If the petitioned court decides to transfer, it must send to the
transferee court the material sought to be disclosed, if feasible, and a written
evaluation of the need for continued grand-jury secrecy. The transferee court
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must afford those persons identified in Rule 6(e)(3)(K) a reasonable
opportunity to appear and be heard.
(M) In Rule 6(e)(3)(D) and Rule 6(e)(3)(I),
(i) the term “substantial threat” means a threat of actual or potential
attack or other grave hostile acts by a foreign power or an agent of a
foreign power, sabotage (as defined in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2152-2156), domestic
or international terrorism (as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2331), or use of
weapons of mass destruction.
(ii) the term “information” as it relates to “a threat of actual or potential
attack or other grave hostile acts by a foreign power or an agent of a
foreign power” means all information relating to the existence,
organization, capabilities, communications, plans, intentions,
vulnerabilities, means of finance or material support, or activities of a
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power relating to such threat, or to
the same information relating to groups or individuals reasonably believed
to be assisting or associated with them.
(iii) the term “information” as it relates to a threat of “sabotage” means
all information relating to the existence, organization, capabilities, plans,
intentions, vulnerabilities, means of finance or material support, or
activities of saboteurs or threats posed by such groups or individuals to the
United States, its persons, or its interests or those of other associate
nations (as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2151), or to communications between
such groups or individuals, or to the same information relating to groups
or individuals reasonably believed to be assisting or associated with them.
(iv) the term “information” as it relates to a threat of “domestic or
international terrorism” threat means all information relating to the
existence, organization, capabilities, plans, intentions, vulnerabilities,
means of finance or material support, or activities of foreign, international,
or domestic terrorist groups or individuals or threats posed by such groups
or individuals to the United States, United States persons, or United States
interests, or those of other nations, or to communications between such
groups or individuals, or to the same information relating to groups or
individuals reasonably believed to be assisting or associated with them.
(v) The term “information” as it relates to a threat of “use of weapons of
mass destruction” means all information relating to conventional explosive
weapons and non-conventional weapons capable of causing mass
casualties and damage, including chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear agents and weapons and the means of delivery of such weapons.
(N) A petition for disclosure pursuant to Rule 6(e)(3)(I) or Rule 6(e)(3)(J)
shall be ruled upon by the judge designated in subparagraph (O)(i) within
forty-eight (48) hours of its filing. Any review of a denial of such a petition
shall be conducted as expeditiously as possible.
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(O) A notice of disclosure pursuant to Rule 6(e)(3)(D) or a petition for
disclosure pursuant to Rule 6(e)(3)(I) or Rule 6(e)(3)(J) shall be filed in the
district where the grand jury convened.
(i) The Chief Judge for each district shall designate one judge serving
within the district and one alternate to review such notices and hear such
petitions for a term of three years. If a petition is denied, the court shall
immediately provide for the record a written statement of each reason for
its decision. On motion of the United States, the record shall be
transmitted, under seal, to the court of review established in Rule
6(e)(3)(O)(ii).
(ii) The Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court shall publicly
designate three judges, one of whom shall be publicly designated as the
presiding judge, from each United States Court of Appeal who together
shall comprise a court of review which shall have jurisdiction to review
the denial of any petition within its Circuit under these subdivisions. If a
court of review determines that the application was properly denied, the
court shall immediately provide for the record a written statement of each
reason for its decision and, on petition of the United States for a writ of
certiorari, the record shall be transmitted under seal to the Supreme Court,
which shall have jurisdiction to review such decision.
(iii) The record of proceedings under Rule 6(e)(3)(O) including notices
filed, petitions made, and orders granted, shall be maintained under
security measures established by the Chief Justice in consultation with the
Attorney General and the Director of Central Intelligence.
This amendment would preserve the best features of the PATRIOT intelligence
exception, the Homeland Security exception, and the information-sharing guidelines issued by
the Attorney General. It recognizes the need for and right of prosecutors to share grand-jury
materials relating to substantial threats to the United States and its people. The pre-9/11 version
of Rule 6(e) was lacking in that it failed to provide for situations in which the need for secrecy is
outweighed by a need to protect against terrorism and other hostile acts.386 Congress did not err
in seeking to rectify this flaw.
Congress did err in completely excluding the courts from the decision-making process
and in completely ignoring the societal interest in grand jury secrecy. Proposed Rule 6(e)(3)(D)

386

The omission of an exception for the disclosure of intelligence information is understandable. Warfare has
changed dramatically. Until recent years, it was unimaginable that the United States would face the type of terrorist
attacks on the home front that now seem all too probable.
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allows prosecutors to act unilaterally when an imminent, substantial threat exists. When time is
of the essence to prevent harm, prosecutors are empowered to act. The definitions found in Rule
6(e)(3)(M) should help prosecutors identify the types of situations in which this power should be
invoked, and the reporting requirement found in proposed Rule 6(e)(3)(D)(iii) should help
prevent prosecutors from abusing this power.
When no imminent threat exists, the proposed amendment affords courts the opportunity
to undertake the traditional, constitutional balancing analysis to determine whether a
particularized need for disclosure exists in this instance and whether that need outweighs
society’s interest in maintaining grand jury secrecy.387 Proposed Rule 6(e)(3)(I) permits
judicially-approved disclosure of substantial threats to the nation’s security,388 and proposed
Rule 6(e)(3)(J) permits judicially-approved disclosure of significant intelligence information.389
The need for heightened security is addressed in Rule 6(e)(3)(0) by the appointment of a
special judge within each district and a special panel within each circuit to handle notices and
petitions filed pursuant to the new exceptions. Not only does the appointment of this special
court permit heightened security, it also creates a corps of judges with special expertise in this
area.390 The need for a rapid decision is dealt with in Rule 6(e)(3)(N), which requires a decision
within forty-eight hours of the filing of a petition.
In short, the proposed amendment would provide the benefit of protecting national
security interests without the heavy cost of destroying the secrecy so crucial to the functioning of
the grand jury.
V. Conclusion

387

See generally supra notes 243 to 292 and accompanying text.
Proposed Rule 6(e)(3)(D) and proposed Rule 6(e)(3)(I) replace the Homeland Security exception.
389
Propose Rule 6(e)(3)(J) replaces the PATRIOT intelligence exception.
390
Such judges should be provided with specialized training.
388
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In creating the PATRIOT intelligence exception and the Homeland Security exception,
Congress acted with the best of intentions. It sought to spare our nation the horror of another
9/11. But in the words of Justice Brandeis,
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the
government's purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to
repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to
liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without
understanding.391

In its zeal to protect our security, Congress created laws which endanger our liberty.
Both the PATRIOT intelligence exception and the Homeland Security exception violate the
Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment.392 Constitutional questions aside, these exceptions
are quite simply bad public policy—they needlessly destroy the indispensable grand jury secrecy
that has been relied upon for almost one thousand years.393
The end of grand jury secrecy alone would not bring the Republic to its knees, but the
destruction of this right must be viewed as part of a pattern. With one stroke of the presidential
pen, Americans arguably lost a right older than the nation itself. Countless other rights were also
impacted by the enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 and the Homeland Security Act of
2002. This silent erosion of our civil rights is frightening and dangerous. In times of national
crisis we must be even more vigilant in protecting the basic rights on which our nation was built.
Congress can do its part to protect national security and to protect these basic rights by
revisiting Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e). With careful drafting, Congress can produce
a rule that strengthens national security while preserving the grand jury system. The goals of
liberty and security are not and should never be viewed as mutually exclusive.
391

Olmstead v. U.S. 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
See supra notes 302 to 320 and 359 to 371.
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See supra notes 321 to 356 and 372 to 384.
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